


JPRS-TND-93-019
22 June 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Proliferation Issues

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-93-019

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22 June 1993

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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'Newsletter' on Nuclear Test Survey Team

OW1506122793 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 0544 GMT 4 Jun 93

["Newsletter" by Central People's Broadcasting Station reporter Su Kuoshan (5685 2368 0810) and XINHUA reporter Jia Yong (6328 3057)]

[Text] Beijing, 4 Jun (XINHUA)—Central Military Commission Chairman Jiang Zemin recently signed an order conferring the honorary title "Research Office That Boldly Scales Scientific and Technological Heights" on the second research office of a certain base institute under the National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission.

Since the successful detonation of our nation's first atomic bomb at Lop Nur on 16 October 1964, this heroic collective has successively completed scores of outstanding tasks in taking physical measurements relating to nuclear testing. A song of dedication has deeply echoed in the heart of the great desert.

To Fulfill the Behest of a Great Man of the Generation

Toward the end of the 1950's, China began to accept the challenge posed by nuclear science. At Chairman Mao's instruction, Premier Zhou personally appointed Lu Min, Sun Ruifan, and several other young scientists to form our nation's first nuclear test measurement team. The team boldly marched toward measurement technology in nuclear testing and scaled the heights in this field.

Physical measurements in the vicinity of test sites determine efficiency assessments and development trends in nuclear testing and serves as a link of utmost importance in the nuclear testing system. To accurately measure various kinds of data in a fraction of a second at the explosion center, where temperatures reach 100 million degrees Celsius, it is necessary to possess not only first-class technology but also first-class facilities. Even today, only a handful of countries can accomplish this task.

For China's scientific and technological personnel, who began from scratch three decades ago, this was no doubt a dangerous peak that was difficult to conquer.

The scientists lacked information, equipment, and even experience; they only possessed a strong desire to serve the nation, which was typical of Chinese intellectuals.

The blockade and obstruction by nuclear powers inspired them to catch up with and overtake other countries.

The scientists vowed: To fulfill the behest of a great man of the generation, we must overcome enormous barriers in physical measurement technology in nuclear testing even if we have to sacrifice our lives.

Almost every pioneer has had the experience of preoccupied oneself with one's laboratory or test range. Precisely because of a desire to catch up with and overtake others, as reflected in this type of preoccupation, our nation acquired physical measurement technology in nuclear testing in a relatively short period of time while other nations took a long time to do so. Premier Zhou, who was far away in Beijing, was overcome with joy and lay awake throughout the night when he learned on 16 October 1964 that the first-generation oscilloscope,

developed by our nation's young scientists, had accurately showed the first atomic test to be a "nuclear explosion." Later, when meeting with personnel involved in the successful test in the company of Comrade Deng Xiaoping at the Great Hall of the People, Premier Zhou made a point of approaching representatives in the second research office to offer his congratulations.

Following the development of our nation's nuclear technology, the requirements for physical measurements in nuclear testing have become stricter: temperature, radiation, space-time, and various unpredictable rays... thousands of sets of data have to be captured in a fleeting moment during every test.

Keeping up-to-date standards for physical measurements in the vicinity of nuclear test sites has once again become an enveloping challenge for scientific and technological personnel in the second research office.

Lu Min chanced upon a set of newfangled technical terminology as he went through a document, and he fully realized that the developed countries had embarked on this completely new field of study. This was no doubt an entirely new idea for making a vital leap in physical measurement technology in nuclear testing. Driven by an even stronger awareness that it was impossible to obtain more information from foreign countries in new and high technology, he immediately urged scientific and technical personnel in the second research office and in relevant coordinating agencies to research relevant information and to launch this project of global significance.

Researcher Wang Kuilu later became the principal responsible person on this subject. Wang, a graduate of the Engineering Physics Faculty of the Qinghua University in the early 1960's, was determined to solve the mystery of survey in the field of nuclear physics from the very day Lu Min put forward his idea. For this purpose, for more than a dozen years in a row Wang Kuilu led a life without holidays or Sundays. His scope of activities covered the laboratory, the test site, and the dormitory with hectic nationwide travel for investigations and studies. By the time when the graphical diagnosis system [tu xiang zhen duan xi tong 0956 0288 6085 2451 4762 4827], created by Wang Kuilu and his comrades-in-arms, with the cooperation of relevant units, came into being with difficulty, thereby further boosting China's physical measurement technology for areas close to nuclear test zone, sideburns at his heroic-looking face had already turned gray. To his regret, however, Premier Zhou, who had made tremendous efforts to and shown concern for the nuclear survey undertaking before his death, could never again share the happiness of success with them. Anyhow, China's nuclear physical survey team has never failed to live up to the trust of a great man of our time. For the past three decades, China has established a set of advanced physical survey systems for areas close to nuclear test zone, which has been successfully applied in many major tests. Seventy-eight achievements won the National Science Conference Awards, the State Science and Technology Advancement Awards, and science and technology awards at ministry and commission levels.

There Is History of Wilderness in Life

The narrow escape of a study group led by Sweden's Evanistin [yi wen si ding 0122 2429 2448 1353] from the Lop Nur at the end of last century left the area with a terrible name: The Sea of Death.

It was from the triumph over The Sea of Death that China's nuclear survey began its journey of catching up with and surpassing the advanced world level.

Ni Yuanxing, currently deputy director of the Second Research Office, still remembers the serious danger he experienced. On his way back to the camp, all of a sudden, a fierce desert hurricane pounded the survey vehicle with sand and stones, leaving visibility of hardly two meters even with the headlights on. As the wind blew harder and harder, sand accumulated higher and higher. After a while, the car was blocked by heaps of sand. The survey team members snuggled together, protecting the survey instruments and braving the assault of the wind and the sand on their bodies.... When rescue team arrived the following morning, the car was found submerged under the wind-blown sand with lights flashing out from the roof of the car as all of its paint was removed by the sand-carrying wind.

Desert wind of this size blows for at least two months a year at Lop Nur. To scientific and technological personnel engaged in nuclear tests, buried by wind-blown sand seemed a common thing. Besides, water of the Peacock River—despite its beautiful name—is bitterer and more pungent than medicine.

No difficulties can prevent China's nuclear survey workers from heading toward exploring and scaling the world standard nor stopping batches and batches of outstanding intellectuals from rushing to this sacred field.

Cong Yun is a young assistant researcher who volunteered himself to the test site. In the summer of 1982 nuclear scientist Cheng Kaijia voiced at the Nanjing University the need for youths with lofty ideals to join the national defense's scientific and technological undertakings. This strengthened Cong Yun's resolve of heading for Lop Nur.

Being here, he soon managed to work independently as a survey expert and was exceptionally promoted to the post of assistant researcher.

The desert is relentless. Scientific and technological personnel here are not wearing their white gowns and comfortably sit in the laboratory with shining windows and clean desks. Their theses were written and their successes were recorded on the Gobi. Whenever a test was carried out, they had to get into a hole full of stale air and seriously short of oxygen, tuning and testing their equipment for several days in a row. As the hole was deep and its entrance small, one had to crawl down. Exposure to stale air caused many to become bald head and drop eyebrows prematurely.

Nevertheless, they did not mind these at all, or rather they did not care to mind. To them there is only one faith: the republic's honor and dignity. For this lofty objective, within minutes after the end of each nuclear test, they dashed into the testing zone regardless of their safety to rescue the survey data, placing the safety of data above that of their own lives....

Warm Blood Will Boil Forever

After more than three decades of unusual explorations, the capability of China's physical survey for nuclear tests has managed to follow the advanced world level at every step. Following the application of a host of high and new technologies, including optical fiber technology, graphical processing technology, and artificial intelligence technology, results that had to be achieved in several days in the past can now be ready in one or two hours. In the past, only intermittent survey could be carried for each test; now, dynamic survey capable of separating time and space is in use, with single parameter survey [dan yi can shu ce liang 0830 0001 0639 2422 3261 6852] being developed into multiparameter comprehensive survey [duo shu zong he ce liang 1122 0639 2422 4844 0678 3261 6852].

For all these, scientists of several generations have almost devoted wholly their wisdom, youth, lives, and warm blood.

Hospitalized at the Beijing Hospital because of illness, Lu Min missed the nuclear tests so much that he wrote the words on his sickbed "back to the test site in dreams." Staring at his son who came to Beijing to visit him, Huang Bao said: "You are not wanted here. Go back to the nuclear tests!"

A string of research data shows that, for the past five years, more than 40 scientific and technological personnel have successively given up their holidays and 120 couples have sent their children back to their own homes so that the husband and wife can carry on with their work at Lop Nur.

OuYang Xiaoping unfortunately contracted acute meningitis and was informed twice by the doctor on its seriousness at a time when his research on the new type of detector entered a crucial stage. Despite this, this youth, who passed the exam for postgraduate studies through self study, simply could not forget his work. Pending full recovery, he carried his one-and-a-half-year sick leave slip and left the hospital for the test zone where his new type of detector was to be tested and appraised. After the successful test, experts unanimously assessed that the new type of detector had reached advanced international level.

Both Cao Jinyun and his wife worked at the Second Research Office. His wife got pregnant in her mid-30's. He received an assignment when his wife was expecting her baby. Prior to Cao Jinyun's departure, his wife suffered difficult labor and the baby died. He rushed to the test zone before his wife's discharge from hospital. She gazed at him from the patient's bed with a reluctant smile and tears poured out nonstop as she turned her face.

Furthermore, there are people like Liu Fulu, a senior electric cable compensation technology engineer with gray sideburns, who has tested electric cables long enough to link Beijing and Lop Nur several times, has never visited the nearby Dun Huang Cave during his few decades of desert travel; and the six engineers who died young and turned their dream-like lives into everlasting rainbows over the Lop Nur....

They have closely tied their lives with the development of the motherland's physical survey technology in nuclear tests.

INDONESIA

First Nuclear Plant To Start Up in 2003

BK1606134293 Jakarta THE INDONESIA TIMES
in English 4 Jun 93 p 3

[Text] Jakarta—Research and Technology Minister B.J. Habibie said Wednesday that Indonesia intended to have a nuclear power plant in 2003 to meet increasing need for electricity in the country.

"To achieve this, a presidential decree on the establishment of a nuclear power supervisory agency is expected to have been issued by November 1993 at the latest," the minister noted.

President Suharto had approved plan to set up plan to set up the agency, he said, adding that the agency would be under the direct control of the president. The need for electricity in the country is estimated to increase by 16 percent annually.

"In the year 2003, we will have additional electricity from nuclear power," Habibie said.

He pointed out that the establishment of a nuclear power plant needed much money and was risky to human safety and to the environment.

"Therefore, we should immediately begin to educate experts who could in time operate the plant safely and to adjust it to the international standard of nuclear plants built in North America, Germany, Japan, and France," he said.

Indonesia's first nuclear power plant is scheduled to be set up on Gunung (Mount) Muria, Central Java on the basis of accurate calculations and thorough research.

Habibie hoped that Indonesian experts in natural sciences and nuclear technology would cooperate with their colleagues at such institutions as the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), the National Agency for Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), the state-owned Electricity Company PLN, and universities in the project.

They are expected to cooperate in drawing up regulations on matters relating to human safety in the establishment of the plant.

JAPAN

DPRK Naval Ships in Sea of Japan Reported

Observing Medium-Range Missile Tests Speculated
OW1206123593 Tokyo KYODO in English
1221 GMT 12 Jun 93

[Text] Tokyo, June 12 KYODO—Two North Korean naval vessels were in the central part of the Sea of Japan in late May, Japan's Defense Agency said Saturday [12 June], speculating that the ships were observing tests of Pyongyang's new medium-range missile.

The agency released pictures of the two ships which a Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol plane spotted at about noon on May 29 in waters about 350 kilometers off Noto Peninsula in central Japan.

The ships, a 1,500 ton-class frigate and a 500 ton-class minesweeper, were moored in the area about 30 kilometers apart for more than one day, agency officials said.

They said the patrol plane also spotted several other North Korean warships north of the frigate and minesweeper.

Agency sources said the vessels were undoubtedly monitoring the test launch of a new North Korean missile capable of reaching western Japan.

Japanese Government sources said Friday that Pyongyang has developed and test fired the Nodong-1 missile which has an estimated range of 1,000 kilometers.

The sources said the missile traveled only 500 kilometers in the test but is capable of hitting Osaka from the northern half of the Korean peninsula. North Korea reportedly plans to extend the range of the missile to 1,300 kilometers.

Military analysts said there have long been rumors that North Korea has developed a missile based on the former Soviet Union's Scud-C and that it would be sold to Iran for oil and foreign currency.

Missile Test Provides Reason for 'Arms Expansion'

SK1306054393 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
13 Jun 93 p 7

[Article by Tokyo-based correspondent Yi Chang-sun, from the "Correspondent Corner" column: "Japan's Sense of Terror for 'Nodong No. 1'"]

[Text] Japan, shocked by the successful test firing of North Korea's new-type missile, "Nodong No. 1," is seeking to build versatile defense systems. The representative effort for this is seen in its expansion of a defense network of "Patriot" missiles and in the introduction of a Theater Missile Defense [TMD] system.

Japan's action was prompted by its judgment that an overall reorganization of a defense network is necessary, because Nagoya, Osaka, and other areas in west Japan are within North Korea's firing range with the development of the Nodong No. 1 missile which has a 1,000-km range. All of Japan is also within the range of the Nodong No. 2 missile, which will have more than a 1,300-km range when it is developed. In particular, Japan regards North Korea's suspected nuclear development, the development of a long-range missile, and the means for delivering the missile as serious threats to its security.

YOMIURI SHIMBUN on 12 June reported that according to "the new medium-range plan for adjustment of defense capabilities," which will begin in 1996, Japan decided to introduce the TMD system to reinforce its defense system.

The TMD system can observe an enemy missile when it is fired from several hundred kilometers to 1,000 km. It can notify the ground base of the missile's firing through a sensor launched in space and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]. The TMD system is a defense system intended to repel the enemy's missile with antimissile missiles.

This paper also reported that Japan will intensively deploy patriot missiles in west Japan in the event that the danger of North Korea's missile attack increases. In addition,

Japan decided to hold unofficial consultations with the United States to work out measures to promptly obtain intelligence about North Korea from U.S. satellites. Japan has been operating patriot missile units in and around Hokkaido since 1990. Based on the 1992 budget, Japan is pushing for the introduction of patriot missiles with upgraded functions.

Some experts in military affairs, however, observed that North Korea's missile development does not present an immediate threat to Japan's security. They noted that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons has not been confirmed and believe that North Korea's technology for making small, highly efficient nuclear weapons that can be carried by the missile has not yet been developed. They observed that the current North Korean missile test was intended for such political purposes as promoting export of its weapons, instigating disturbances among the ROK, the United States, and Japan, using it as a test diplomatic card, and so forth.

Experts in military affairs do not attach great military importance to the North Korean missile issue. But the Japanese Government's reaction has been extremely sensitive, thus creating even a sense of crisis to a certain extent. The attitude of Japan's news circles is also the same as that of the government. Therefore, one has a feeling that North Korea's missile development is offering another justification for Japan's arms expansion.

Further on Defense Agency Speculation

SK1506012693 Seoul YONHAP in English
0116 GMT 15 Jun 93

[Text] Tokyo, June 15 (YONHAP)—The Japanese Defense Agency officially announced on Monday that North Korea must have test fired a medium-range missile over the East Sea [Sea of Japan] on May 29.

"We assume the missile may most highly be the medium-range ballistic missile Nodong-1, with a range of 1,000 kilometers, but cannot rule out the possibility of the Scud-C model that has already been deployed," it said.

"However, we cannot confirm whether the test was a success," the agency said.

Japan would strengthen its vigilance against North Korea and accelerate deployment of advanced Patriot anti-missile systems, it said.

"The two North Korean vessels, a frigate and a mine sweeper, that were spotted by a PC-3 Orion anti-submarine patrol aircraft by chance on May 29 in the East Sea are presumed to have been mobilized for assisting in the test," the announcement said.

The agency refused to go into details about how it came to know of the test, but said it presumed the missile was launched from around Nodong on the east coast of North Korea and traveled a distance of approximately 500 kilometers.

The agency gave indications that the U.S. Forces in Japan had confirmed the test launch, saying, "we have obtained more detailed information from the U.S. Forces."

NORTH KOREA

Delegation Head News Conference Reported

SK1206105793 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1040 GMT 12 Jun 93

["DPRK and USA Agree on Refraining From Nuclear Threat and Respecting the Other's System and Sovereignty. - DPRK Delegation Chief Interviewed in New York"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, June 12 (KCNA)—First Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK Kang Sok-chu, head of the DPRK delegation, called a press conference in New York on June 11 upon the conclusion of the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

Kang said that the talks were historical talks between the DPRK and the USA and they were held for long hours in a sincere atmosphere as the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was related to the policy of the United States toward the DPRK. "Policy matters concerning the emergence of the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula were discussed at the talks," he added.

He stated that the talks were not a commercial dealing for giving and taking something over the withdrawal of the DPRK from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), but were a political course dealing with policies. "This is proven by the joint statement adopted at the talks," he said.

"It is a very important political matter that the sides at the talks reached an agreement on not presenting nuclear threat, on respecting each other's system and sovereignty and not interfering in each other's internal affairs," he stressed, and said: "This agreement shows what the political cause of our 'nuclear problem' is."

Noting that the sides decided to continue the talks to seek ways of carrying into effect the questions of principle agreed upon by the sides, the DPRK and the USA, in the joint statement, Kang said: "This is another affirmative success of the talks."

Noting that in view of the importance of the talks the DPRK took an independent step of suspending the effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT as long as it considers necessary, he said this step, like its measure of withdrawing from the treaty, is entirely an independent one.

Referring to the U.S. request at the talks that the DPRK should remain committed to the treaty and comply with the safeguards agreement of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], he said this is a very serious matter related to the partiality of the agency against the DPRK.

He told the reporters that the sides agreed to discuss the question of partiality of the agency at the future talks.

A series of questions were raised at the press conference.

Answering questions put by reporters, the head of the delegation said the question of inspection by the IAEA

during the period of the suspension of the decision to withdraw from the treaty entirely depends on the impartiality of the agency.

"It was decided that the sides should agree upon the question of next talks on a working level," he said.

He stated that it depends on the results of the talks and the impartiality of the IAEA what will become of the DPRK's step of suspending its withdrawal from the NPT, because it was taken to find a way for the realization of the DPRK-U.S. joint statement.

"The publication of the joint statement is the first of its kind in the relations between the DPRK and USA," he said, adding: "It is a historical event that the most acute policy matters were discussed and agreed upon at the talks."

Possible Economic Aid to DPRK by Israel Examined

Relations Accelerated

SK1606045493 Seoul HANGUK ILBO in Korean
16 Jun 93 p 4

[Article by reporter Kim Yong-kol: "Israel Makes Gesture to North Korea for Improvement of Relations"]

[Text] The moves for improvement of relations between North Korea and Israel are being accelerated.

Israel is planning to send Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to Pyongyang soon for talks with North Korean leaders.

This is unusual in view of the relations between the two countries to date, since the two countries have long been in unfriendly relations because of North Korea's pro-Arab foreign policy and Israel's pro-ROK tendency.

Israel reached out its hand in a surprisingly fast move to North Korea in an effort to stop North Korea from supplying "Nodong-1," the medium-range missile which North Korea has developed, to Middle Eastern countries hostile to Israel. Israel, in return, is reported to have offered economic aid.

Foreign Minister Peres met U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington on 14 June to discuss the Israeli plan to contact North Korea with the United States, which is, as it were, an "eldest brother" to Israel.

The United States has opposed the Israeli contact with North Korea since North Korea declared its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The United States, however, is reported to be considering revoking this position now that North Korea suspended its decision to withdraw from the NPT on 11 June.

The secret contact between North Korea and Israel began early last October. According to Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, Foreign Minister Peres was invited by North Korea to visit Pyongyang then, but he postponed the visit trying to read the U.S. mind because of the increasing suspicion of North Korean nuclear weapons development.

It has been revealed, however, that Israel dispatched its working-level officials to North Korea. In the working-level North Korea-Israel contact, Israel is reported to have

offered to purchase the gold mine near Unsan in North Korea provided that North Korea stop selling its missiles to Iran. According to the report of the news magazine TIME dated 7 June, North Korea only asked Israel for thousands of trucks as economic aid. TIME said that the Israeli authorities estimates the total amount of their aid to North Korea to be around \$1 billion.

Israel has thus been very active in approaching North Korea because of the terrifying performance of the Nodong-1 which is reported to have completed a launch test.

Nodong-1, which North Korea produced by improving the Scud-C type Soviet missile, has a range of 1,000 kilometers. If hostile countries to Israel such as Iran and Syria purchase Nodong-1, Israeli security will be seriously threatened.

Moreover, Iran is reported to have dispatched a military delegation to North Korea last April and negotiated the purchase of 150 missiles of this type for an initial purchase order. Israel is highly alarmed at this.

Israel still vividly remembers the nightmare of the Iraqi Scud missile that fell on its territory during the Gulf war. Therefore, it seems that Israel had nothing more urgent for its national security than preventing Nodong-1, whose performance far exceeds that of the Iraqi Scud, from being exported to the Middle East.

Mossad, Israel's secret intelligence agency, moved so swiftly to collect information about North Korea's Nodong-1 that it informed Japan and the United States of the North Korean plan to trial launch Nodong-1 weeks in advance.

Some observers are even predicting a "three-way negotiation" participated in by the United States as well if the North Korean-Israeli negotiation progresses smoothly.

The North Korean sale of Nodong-1 to the Middle East is an important pending issue not only to Israel but to the United States as well. If North Korea gives up selling Nodong-1's to the Middle East, it will give further assurance to the countries concerned of the credibility of the North Korean suspension of its withdrawal from the NPT agreed upon between North Korea and the United States.

Therefore, through the three-way talks, Israel will be able to free itself from the worries about Nodong-1, the United States will be able to harvest another success in its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, and North Korea will be able to get a practical profit of economic aid.

The pace for the improvement of North Korean-Israeli relations, therefore, may well be influenced by the progress of North Korea-U.S. negotiations.

ROK 'Concerned' With Contacts

SK1606034493 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
16 Jun 93 p 2

[Text] The government is concerned about the approach of Israel to North Korea amid suspicion about the latter's nuclear development.

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres said Monday that he wanted to visit North Korea to dissuade it from selling

missiles to Iran. Israeli officials said there had been secret contacts despite a lack of formal ties between the two nations, according to foreign news reports.

A Foreign Ministry official in Seoul said that it is improper for Israel to send its foreign minister to the North during the critical situation even if Israel's intention is to block sales of weapons to Arab nations.

Israeli Foreign Minister Peres was quoted as saying he is seeking U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's support for such a mission when they meet in Austria at the World Conference on Human Rights.

Pyon Chong-kyu, director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East and African Affairs Bureau, commented that North Korea is certain to be in serious trouble with its economy amid increasing isolation from the world due to its suspected nuclear program.

He said, "We have not heard anything from Israel about the reported Peres' visit to Pyongyang." Director-General Pyon yesterday called in Israeli Ambassador Asher Naim.

Pyon quoted Naim as saying that he had no information about the news reports. Naim only said that North Korean issues are handled at the American Affairs bureau of Israeli Foreign Ministry but not the Asian bureau.

He promised that he would inform the South Korean government about Israeli plans when he returns to Seoul from one month leave in his home country, Pyon said. Naim was quoted as saying he will head for his home country Monday for leave.

Pyon said that Foreign Minister Han Sung-chu now in Vienna to attend the World Conference on Human Rights has plans to meet Israeli Foreign Minister Peres there. Peres is also attending the world conference.

According to a report in the June 7 issue of the weekly magazine TIME, the North Korean government sent an invitation to Israeli Foreign Minister Peres last December, following a visit of an assistant minister level official to Pyongyang last October.

The North Korean Central News Agency denied the TIME report on June 11, saying that Pyongyang had never offered such an invitation nor sold weapons, including missiles, to Arab nations in the Middle East.

But it is a very sensitive period for Israeli Foreign Minister Peres' announcement to want to visit Pyongyang as the North Korean nuclear issue has been boiling over. Israel sees it as critical to block North Korea from selling missiles to Arab nations, an official from the Institute of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations (IFANS) affiliated to the Foreign Ministry said.

He presumed that an Israeli high-ranking official, who visited Pyongyang last October, had been given assurances that North Korea would not sell missiles in return for economic support to North Korea.

Peres said in the wire reports, "I do not need a visa from the Americans to go to North Korea. The Americans are negotiating with the North Koreans."

Israel is a non-member nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

SOUTH KOREA

Seoul Says U.S. 'Virtually Acquiesced' to DPRK Reasoning

SK1206033593 Seoul YONHAP in English
0311 GMT 12 Jun 93

["News Analysis" by Yi Tong-min: "N.K. Nuke Returns to Starting Point, IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Moves to Center Stage"]

[Text] Seoul, June 12 (YONHAP)—The North Korea-U.S. high-level talks have succeeded in turning back the clock, keeping the hardline communist country under international rules for the moment.

In return for Pyongyang's agreement on Friday to stay in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Washington made a symbolic political promise to continue talks at high government level.

It is too early for sighs of relief, however, since the initial problem remains—Pyongyang is yet to agree to open key suspected nuclear facilities to international inspection.

The North Korean nuclear problem has returned to exactly where it was before the March 12 announcement of NPT withdrawal. After four rounds of cliffhanger negotiations with Washington, Pyongyang has decided to "suspend as long as it considers necessary" its withdrawal from the NPT.

The big prize was Washington's agreement to "continue dialogue on an equal and unprejudiced basis." North Korea is said to have demanded talks at a higher level, specifically U.S. Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff, who can negotiate improvement of bilateral relations in addition to nuclear issues.

What Washington gave Pyongyang, although not much more than a political statement, will have long-lasting impact. North Korea has long insisted that the nuclear issue is one between it and the United States, not South Korea or the international community.

The United States, by holding talks with North Korea on the nuclear issue, virtually acquiesced to this reasoning.

At the same time, North Korea succeeded in separating inter-Korean simultaneous inspections from U.S. interference by getting Washington to support an inter-Korean agreement for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. In other words, Washington agrees that implementation of the denuclearization agreement is strictly between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Pyongyang also made Washington promise fairness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for "impartial application of fullscope safeguards," a measure that could open up U.S. military bases in the South to outside inspection in exchange for suspected sites in the North under this promised principle of fairness.

What Washington earned is the legal basis to demand North Korea's compliance with IAEA regular and special inspections. Once Pyongyang's NPT withdrawal became effective on June 12, North Korea would have been freed from its obligations to the IAEA.

While the United States succeeded in keeping the obligations alive, the task of getting North Korea to comply was and remains the key point; and this point is far from being fulfilled.

Officials say the next North Korea-U.S. contact, possibly at higher level than the past meetings, is expected about two weeks later.

South Korea and the United States will mobilize all possible means during the two week period to have the IAEA and North Korea reach some type of compromise in opening up Pyongyang's suspected sites to agency inspection, officials here say.

The IAEA has already said it will not insist on "special inspection" on the two wanted sites as long as it can carry out an inspection with the same effects.

North Korea is unlikely to give the IAEA the cold shoulder since the success of its negotiations with the agency will determine whether the United States is going to give more rewards at future talks.

Chang Chae-ryong, director-general of the American Affairs Bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, was flying to Washington to decide exactly how much time South Korea and the United States will give North Korea to work out the IAEA inspections.

The North Korean nuclear situation has returned to the starting point, officials here say, and the real work has only begun.

Seoul To Accept DPRK Proposal for Working-Level Talks

SK1206053393 Seoul YONHAP in English
0516 GMT 12 Jun 93

[Text] Seoul, June 12 (YONHAP)—South Korea decided to accept North Korea's proposal for a working-level meeting to discuss an exchange of envoys following Pyongyang's official announcement it would stay in the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Unification Vice Minister Song Yong-tae said Saturday [12 June].

Song said, after a unification-related strategic meeting, Prime Minister Hwang In-song would send a telephone message to his North Korean counterpart, Kang Song-san, on Monday to convey Seoul's official position.

Song positively appraised the joint U.S.-North Korean statement Friday, calling it "a trustworthy agreement that could contribute to the security and peace of the Korean peninsula."

"We will consider North Korea's proposal for a working-level talk on Tuesday in a positive direction," he said.

If the working-level meeting takes place, it will be a first inter-Korean contact since the Joint Nuclear Control Commission chairmen's contact on Jan. 25.

The joint U.S.-North Korea statement conforms to South Korea's efforts to have dialogue with North Korea to solve the nuclear problem, he said.

"In particular, North Korea's promise to abide by the inter-Korean agreement on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula reflects our government's position," he said.

"I believe the statement will contribute to practical development of inter-Korean relations," Song said, adding that Seoul's specific plan will be delivered to North Korea on Monday by telephone.

"Even if the meeting take place, we will stick to our basic position," Song said, making it clear that Pyongyang would have to accept simultaneous inter-Korean inspections to solve the nuclear issue.

So South and North are highly likely to hold working-level talks on Tuesday at the Truce Village of Panmunjom as proposed by Pyongyang to discuss an exchange of presidential envoys.

Song and Yi Sung-kon, southern-side chairman of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), are expected to represent Seoul while Kim Wan-su, the senior counselor in the Administration Council in charge of unification, and Chon Hung-yul will attend from Pyongyang.

ARGENTINA**Menem May Discuss Future of Condor-2 With Clinton****Future of Falda del Carmen Facility Uncertain**

PY1106022393 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS
in Spanish 1450 GMT 10 Jun 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 10 June (NA)—While the summit between Presidents Carlos Menem and Bill Clinton is only 20 days away, the future of the Falda del Carmen secret facility in Cordoba Province, where the Condor-2 missile project was developed, may result in a conflict of interests between Argentina and the United States.

It was leaked that U.S. Ambassador to Argentina Terence Todman—who in a few days will turn over his post to his successor James Cheek—is taking steps to have the Falda del Carmen facilities dismantled and thus put an end to the Condor-2 issue.

The Argentine Government, for its part, would intend to propose bringing a team of U.S. experts to recycle the facilities for missile development. This subject would be raised during the visit Menem will make to the United States at the end of the month.

Argentina would therefore try to recycle the Falda del Carmen facilities for peaceful uses, and thus avoid having to blow them up, as they cost the country some \$300 million worth of investment.

The key components of the missile project were sent to the United States, via Spain, this year to be destroyed there. Three of the 12 computers for guided control that were on the inventory list, however, are still being requested, as they were found to be missing.

In the forthcoming days the president may issue a decree lifting the confidentiality over the development of the Condor project. Air Force officers contended that as it was a top secret project, they could not reveal the components' whereabouts.

Defense Minister Oscar Camilion reportedly believes that the Falda del Carmen facilities should not be dismantled in order not to create problems with the Armed Forces commands, among other things.

Foreign Minister Guido di Tella, for his part, is anxiously awaiting the presidential decree, all the more as an Argentine-North American commission will meet for the first time in two weeks to discuss hemispheric security matters. Di Tella thus hopes to adopt a low profile vis-a-vis this issue when Menem and Clinton meet on Tuesday, 29 June.

Todman presented his first complaints to Eduardo Bauza, secretary general of the presidency, so as to settle the Condor-2 issue. The latter took a political gamble and summoned Camilion to tell him the Air Force's opinion.

It was precisely the Air Force, which fashioned the missile project, the one that expressed certain reservations about the government's decision to send 14 engines and other components of the Condor-2 to the United States for their destruction.

Decision To Dismantle Condor-2 'Definite'

PY1206165193 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish
0205 GMT 12 Jun 93

[Text] Buenos Aires, 11 Jun (TELAM)—The government decision to dismantle the Condor-2 missile "is definite," according to a statement today by Defense Minister Oscar Camilion, who reiterated that the vector, regarded as a "potentially massive destruction weapon, has already been dismantled."

Camilion, who last week visited the Falda del Carmen plant—where the missile was built—asserted that the project "was dismantled and will not be recycled in that direction" and announced the possibility that this plant will be open to the public because "it no longer has a strategic purpose."

Although he did not say what the Falda del Carmen plant could be used for, the minister said that "a great effort" will be made to determine how the building will be used, noting that "technical advice was necessary for this."

Regarding the alleged visits by politicians and government officials to Magdalena prison, Camilion said "it is a closed matter. The visits were denied by the persons involved and it was proven, by looking at the visitor's book, who had entered and who had not."

Changing the subject, Camilion admitted the Armed Forces' "concern" over the salary policy, although he noted that the subject not only worries military personnel but also a "large number of citizens who would also like to have a better salary."

In this sense he said that the Armed Forces' budget was the "predominant subject" discussed during the past few weeks in meetings he held with the military leadership.

Moreover, he denied rumors on the secret construction of a submarine at Hipasam [not further identified] premises in Rio Negro and noted that these charges are not "serious" because this company "does not build submarines."

Camilio said: "It must be a chocolate submarine, because that is all it can be. It is very difficult to build submarines."

EGYPT

Convicted Spy Tried To Sell Enriched Uranium

NC1506104093 Paris AFP in English 0935 GMT
15 Jun 93

[Text] Cairo, June 15 (AFP)—An Egyptian lawyer hanged for spying had first offered to sell enriched uranium to his government before Israeli intelligence recruited him in Austria, a pro-government newspaper reported Tuesday.

Egyptian authorities turned down the offer from 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam al-Shahid while he was on a trip home from Vienna, where he had gone in 1990 to complete a doctorate in law, AL-AKHBAR newspaper said.

Al-Shahid returned to Austria where he delivered secrets about Egyptian "military technology" to Israeli intelligence who recruited him to set up a spy ring, it said.

The paper did not say how al-Shahid, a civilian, obtained the military secrets.

People he tried to recruit reported him to Egyptian authorities who then put him under surveillance and arrested him. He was convicted by a military court in May 1992, and executed on Sunday in a central Cairo prison.

A statement from the military prosecutor's office said al-Shahid had given military secrets to a foreign state, which officials said was Israel.

Israeli Defense Ministry spokesman Oded Ben Ami said he knew of no Egyptian spying for Israel.

INDIA

Commentary Notes Features of Prithvi Missile

BK1506124293 Delhi All India Radio General Overseas
Service in English 1010 GMT 15 Jun 93

[Commentary by A. C. Pandyan, bureau chief of DEVELOPMENT NEWS SERVICE]

[Text] India's medium range surface-to-surface missile Prithvi was fired on 12 June in its full operational mode with an enhanced range. The 11th launch of the 350-km range missile, which was test fired over high seas, accomplished all mission requirements with an accurate impact over a pre-determined range traced by radars of naval warships. This launch was the first from the production batch and has used land-based mobile launcher and mobile control. The Prithvi missiles are already in production at Bharat Dynamics, Hyderabad, which is the prime production agency in partnership with Hindustan Aeronautics; ordnance factories; Bharat Electricals; Bharat Earth-movers Limited; and a number of other public and private sector units.

The successful test firing of the missile would herald under trial of the missile with the Army the idea to have a ballistic missile system conceived by defense experts in the early eighties, keeping in view the regional security aspects. The first experimental flight named PO-1 took place on 28 February 1988. For the Defense Research and Development Organization—DRDO—which undertook this experimental flight, it is a major success as it tested the propulsion guidance and the control aspects in the single

flight as against the three planned flights which would have checked each system separately. The missile, which can carry a payload of nearly one ton, has an on-board computer to perform inertial navigation. In inertial navigation system, the computer reads the topography of the area over which the missile is flying and changes its flight as per the changes in the layout of the ground. It can correct its flight even if the engine has burnt out. This missile system can store a number of automated commands to change the flight path so as to evade the Patriot system missiles and take on different targets. The missile system excels over other comparable missile systems with respect to the circular error probability, also with just 100 to 150-200 meters of other systems. That is, it will not miss the target by more than a difference of 100 meters. The missiles use a liquid propellant consisting of 50 percent (axilignce), and the balance of 3-D (Lemine) and nitric acid used as an oxide. The missile system is loaded with a fuel which has a shelf life of five years and without the propellant fuel, its life is 25 years. The Prithvi missile has the capability to destroy concrete structure and it has tremendous lethal powers to destroy targets. The kind of targets which battlefield support missiles like Prithvi are likely to engage include large military bases and airfields, troop staging areas, and industrial facilities like oil depots.

Acquisition of such missiles is likely to add to the national deterrence potential because of the deep strike penetrability. India's both neighbors—China and Pakistan—have acquired similar missile capability to counter India's missile potential. China is also exporting missiles like M-11 to Pakistan which with its 600-km range gives it a longer range than Prithvi. Pakistan has also commenced development of HATF-2 missile which has a range of 300 km. We, therefore, have a classic case of pragmatic deterrence where India develops missiles to deter its hostile neighbor.

Nuclear Industry Deemed To Have Come of Age

93WP0165 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
10 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by Cecil Victor: "India's Nuclear Export Capability"]

[Text] Thailand's request for nuclear power technology marks the coming of age of India's nuclear industry. With the distinction of achieving a complete fuel cycle based on monazite beach sands this country will have to learn to sell its expertise in the minefields laid by western cartels.

After years of suffering an embargo on nuclear-related equipment and fuel for the flagship Tarapur power station following the 1974 peaceful nuclear experiment (PNE) at Pokharan (Rajasthan), India's nuclear scientists put the country beyond blackmail by developing a mixed oxide fuel (MOX) and thereby rendering the embargo infructuous.

Since then they have developed technology for what are known as "fast breeder" reactors using a blanket of thorium produced from the beach sands of Kerala—a technology in which even China has shown keen interest.

But "fast breeders" in developing countries are taboo to the US and its allies because they produce plutonium with which nuclear bombs can be made. "Fast breeders" as the name suggests produce more fuel than they consume in the

core vessel and with thorium as catalyst would obviate the need to set up expensive factories and politically inconvenient foreign linkages for uranium-based reactors.

Uranium reactors require enrichment facilities—something the developed world will not part with because it gives them a monopoly over the uranium-based fuel cycle. Also, spent fuel dumps (intricate technology in itself if radiation hazard is to be contained) lend themselves to a new kind of blackmail intended to pry open national sovereignties to teams of international inspectors bent on enforcing full scope safeguards on those more interested in using the atom to produce electricity.

Indian expertise is being sought to be circumscribed by the nuclear weapons powers on the pretext of curbing proliferation. That was the objection raised when Iran showed interest in Indian technology, confirming fears in the developing world that high technology in every frontier science is being used as a tool of imperialism.

But it is also increasingly becoming apparent that such restrictive practices can lead to the very proliferation that is professed to be controlled: Pakistan and North Korea are prime examples.

India which has developed expertise in both explosive technology and power technology has, as a matter of deliberate State policy, not produced nuclear weapons though it has the means of producing scores of bombs at short notice.

It will however have to mould a marketing strategy in keeping with the International Atomic Energy Agency's "safeguards" clauses and insist on their applicability to ensure that the recipient nations do not divert to weapons production.

There are bilateral and international instruments to ensure this and India must not allow itself to be browbeaten into keeping its expertise in the closet while the cartel continues to milk the world nuclear technology market.

In South East Asia there are several nations which see advantages in nuclear power technology and would show interest if India sheds its hesitation, a hesitation induced by the cartel's threats and pressures.

Given the fact that Japan has been encouraged in its pursuit of "fast breeder" nuclear technology (a shipload of plutonium has just been delivered) and the US and Russia are going to utilise the plutonium from dismantled nuclear bombs to produce electricity in a joint facility to be set up in the US, India need not be apologetic about its indigenously-developed expertise and learn to make it more cost-beneficial by exporting it.

Surface-to-Surface Missile Successfully Tested 12 June

BK1206124993 Delhi All India Radio Network in English 1230 GMT 12 Jun 93

[Text] The 11th launch of the surface-to-surface missile Prithvi was successfully carried out today somewhere on the eastern coast. According to a Defense Ministry spokesman in New Delhi, the missile blasted off at 1220 [0650 GMT] with its full user configuration in the operational mode before commencement of the user's trial. The

spokesman said today's flight accomplished all mission requirements. He said the launch was from the production batch and used a mobile launcher and the mobile control center.

PAKISTAN

'Mutually Acceptable' Nuclear Stance With India Urged

BK1206133593 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST in English 12 Jun 93 p 10

[Editorial: "Resolving the Nuclear Issue"]

[Text] As a response to the international pressures Pakistan is primary facing on the nuclear issue, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has spelled out his domestic political constraints by saying that no Pakistani government can roll back the country's nuclear programme and survive. There is no doubt that such a unilateral initiative would spell political suicide for any Pakistani leaders, besides being inconsistent with its valid defence requirements. As matters stand, India has the capability of producing more than a hundred bombs while Pakistan can put together about a dozen. Given the vast superiority of India's conventional forces, Pakistan considers a nuclear deterrent necessary against aggression from India. Yet in the interest of peace, Pakistan stands internationally committed to the concept of a nuclear-free South Asia, if India complies. It has repeatedly called for internationally-sponsored multi-lateral talks, so that the two neighbours can find a mutually acceptable formula to move towards that goal—a proposal that the Indian government is not prepared to consider.

There can be no denying the fact that a nuclear race in the subcontinent will be economically crippling for both Pakistan and India. Already, the vast resources diverted towards defence have served to compound internal problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and the like. The religious extremism and political instability, which the resultant economic malaise had bred, threatens both political systems. There are same voices in both Pakistan and India, who courageously move against the popular current of uncompromising hostility and counsel confidence building measures leading to a mutual cut-back or freeze, in conventional defence forces and in the nuclear field. Most recently, the wisdom of moving from confrontation to cooperation in the subcontinent, was forcefully expressed by the editor-of THE TIMES OF INDIA, Mr Bidwai, in an interview with a Pakistani correspondent. Such voices have to be encouraged by our political leaders if the crucial necessity of detente for economic survival is to infiltrate the national psyches. In Pakistan, if the government were to subject the nuclear issue to enlightened debate rather than make it a holy cow, a political climate conducive to taking fresh initiatives, without compromising genuine defence requirements, would become possible. Most importantly, it is crucial to educate the populace to the effect that it is our vital national interests which demand a resolution of the nuclear issue, so that perceptions are not limited, as they presently are, by self-defeating reactions to international pressures. On the other hand, if the doves in both countries are to be encouraged, the US will have to develop an even-handed approach when dealing with the nuclear issue in the

subcontinent and in this respect approach of the Clinton administration is relatively encouraging. One sided pressure on Pakistan only serves to build a hostile internal reaction, which helps to increase the popularity of the hawkish view in this country. And it boisters India's rigidity which stands in the way of a compromise.

Institute's Nuclear Research Role Praised

BK1206131393 Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST
in English 12 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Karachi (PPI)—Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), Islamabad has recently established a mobile radiation monitoring laboratory as part of the countrywide emergency preparedness programme, it is learnt.

PINSTECH serves as a national calibration laboratory with secondary standard instruments to assume that personal dosimetry of the [words indistinct] environmental monitoring programme meets international standards for radiation doses.

Some 2000 radiation workers in 300 establishments around the country are availing the personal monitoring service using film dosimeters.

In the coming years the institute would be called upon to play an even greater role in the development of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Programme, and in opening up new areas of research.

Work in several high-tech areas such as fibre optics, computer networking, advanced materials, including ceramics and powder metallurgy, and reactor design has already been envisaged.

Like any other living and vibrant centre, it will evolve and mutate to meet the growing and diverse needs of the nation's peaceful nuclear effort, and in particular to further strengthen its role in the development of technical manpower.

Over the last 25 years of its existence PINSTECH has made notable contributions to the development of the overall scientific and technological infrastructure of the country and in particular to the advancement of nuclear research.

It has played a key role in the implementation of all the major nuclear programmes and projects in the country. It has indeed developed into one of the finest nuclear research, development and training institutes in the third world. Its laboratories are rated high and used as reference laboratories in certain fields.

It has also rendered technical support to institutes, industries and national organisations in such diverse areas as

radioisotope applications, radiation monitoring, [words indistinct] repair and maintenance of electronic instruments and computers.

Provision of special services, particularly to armed forces, include fractography and microanalysis of failures in operating systems and machines.

It was [words indistinct] an ambitious programme to develop radiation cross linked polymers of high quality for use as insulating material in electrical cables.

An important area of work is the production of isotopes for medical uses utilising the nuclear reactors of the institute. Regular production of radioisotopes on large scale was achieved after commissioning of radioisotope production cells provided with remote handling facilities in 1979.

[Word indistinct] such as [words indistinct] Gold-198, Chromium-51 and Phosphorous-32, etc., and their labelled compounds are produced and supplied in various hospitals and medical centres established by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) all over the country.

These compounds [word indistinct] physical, chemical and biological control before they are released for use. To produce certain specific compounds and radiopharmaceuticals in a germ-free atmosphere, a clean laboratory has been set up recently.

Over the years very substantial research and development work has been carried out on Co-60 gamma radiation for producing useful materials from agricultural waste, radiation sterilisation of surgical gloves and vials and the improvement of colour and clarity of precious stones through the radiation and heat-treatment. The experience so [words indistinct] in the establishment of a commercial [word indistinct] plant near Lahore.

The initial batches of yellow cake and well characterised Uranium Dioxide powder for Karachi Nuclear Power Plant fuel were produced at PINSTECH. [Words indistinct] instruments and mass-spectrometers for the measurement of trace elements in hydrological, biological, and geological samples are also developed and fabricated at the institute.

A new control and instrumentation panel with on-line process control for Pakistan Research Reactor (PaRR-i) was locally designed and fabricated.

PINSTECH has also provided facilities to train scientists [words indistinct] in highly technical disciplines of nuclear science and technology. The formal training is imparted at the Centre for Nuclear Studies (CNS) of the institute through short term and long term academic programmes and by arranging specialised courses in various disciplines.

The [words indistinct] these are master's degree programmes in nuclear engineering, systems engineering and nuclear medicine. A Ph.D Programme in nuclear engineering has also commenced at the institute.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES

Commentary on Pentagon's View of Russian-Ukraine 'Rift'

AU1506153593 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT
in German 14 Jun 93 p 2

[Viola Herms Drath commentary: "Unpredictable Security"]

[Text] Even though a revision of U.S. security policy is a priority in the Pentagon because of the cutbacks in the defense budget and the changes in the global concert of powers, Clinton's strategy for promoting world peace by means of military and economic stabilization, including the active support of democracy and human rights, has not managed to become more than a draft. Instead of considering prospects for the future, as planned, the administration sees itself confronted with conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and other Third World countries, which require immediate solutions.

During the past turbulent week, this meant sending 300 U.S. soldiers to Macedonia to prevent a spreading of the Bosnian conflict—which was decided at the NATO ministers' conference in a seaside resort near Athens—and the use of U.S. combat aircraft in Somalia against the arms depots and the radio station of Somali tribal leader Aidid.

Russia's Arms Trade Develops Unbraked

In addition, it means constant negotiations with North Korea about the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. However, it also means a decision about underground nuclear tests, which U.S. Congress does not welcome at all.

It is not enough that, despite Washington's protests, the Russians continue to expand their arms trade, which amounted to \$3.4 billion in 1992 and also includes Iran, which is being boycotted by the United States, or that hundreds of Russian military advisers are active in Libya, Syria, and Iraq: Now Moscow also wants to revise the 1990 treaty on the control of conventional forces in Europe, which was negotiated through years of patient talks. The Russian proposal envisages a redistribution of its reduced military forces in the West, which used to be lined up against NATO, to its southern flank. Apart from the renewed outbreak of the conflict between the Armenian enclave and the Muslims in Azerbaijan, there are not only disputes with Georgia about the province of Abkhazia, but also with Moldova and, in particular, Ukraine. Since Kiev considers itself to be a successor state to the Soviet Union, just like Moscow, on this basis it insists on its claim to the Crimea and is using nuclear weapons as a political bargaining chip. Worried that a revision of the complex treaty would batter the agreement and even further destabilize the region bordering on Turkey, Clinton's defense experts have reacted with corresponding reticence.

Not without good reason did U.S. Defense Secretary Aspin call on his Russian counterpart, General Pavel Grachev, to reach a compromise in view of the deepening rift between Russia and Ukraine concerning the START Treaty and the disputed nuclear weapons. And while Aspin visited the Ukrainians in person to persuade them to hand over the remaining 1,800 missile warheads, if necessary to an

international organization like the United Nations or the CSCE, he was fully aware that the pending signing of the START Treaty would not necessarily be linked to a declaration of nuclear abstinence, despite high Western financial aid and security guarantees.

An Offer to Ukraine

However, what worries the Pentagon much more at the moment is the collision course that Kiev and Moscow are steering as regards the issue of nuclear weapons. For this purpose, contacts between the U.S. and Russian military are to be established for the training of troops for peace-keeping operations. Hand in hand with that there is the exchange of intelligence information.

Realizing that the Ukraine Parliament would probably be more inclined to approve the handing over of the nuclear weapons if it knew the United States were on its side, a similar proposal was also made to Ukraine. However, Pentagon strategists are aware that international political structures have become more unpredictable and that the representation of international interests can be carried out only at the multinational level.

RUSSIA

Statute on Issuing Permits for Handling Nuclear Materials

Text of Statute

93WN0457A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
10 Jun 93 pp 5, 6

[Statute on Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activities Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them]

[Text] 1. General Provisions

1.1. Temporary permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor [Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety] for activities associated with producing, handling, and using radioactive substances and articles made from them are issued on the basis of the Statute on the Russian Gosatomnadzor, approved by Order No. 283-rp of the president of the Russian Federation dated 5 June 1992 and Edict No. 1355 of the president of the Russian Federation dated 12 November 1992 "On State Supervisory Bodies."

1.2. This Statute on the Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activities Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them (referred to hereinafter as the Statute) establishes the procedures associated with issuing temporary permits for the following forms of activity:

- producing oxides of natural uranium (thorium);
- storing radioactive wastes from producing oxides of natural uranium (thorium);
- using radioactive substances to produce radioactive isotope sources and/or radiation equipment;
- using nuclear materials to produce radioactive isotope sources and/or radiation equipment;
- processing radioactive wastes for the purposes of

storage and burial at an enterprise specializing in handling radioactive wastes;

- storing and/or burying radioactive wastes (including depleted radioactive isotope sources and radiation equipment) at an enterprise specialized in the handling of radioactive wastes;
- terminating the activities indicated above at facilities presenting a radiation danger (maintaining facilities in preserved state, decontaminating them, restoration of their sites);
- carrying out scientific research and/or experimental and design (planning) work using radioactive substances, nuclear materials, and articles made from them with the purpose of developing the technology (the products) of the production operations indicated above.

1.3. This Statute shall remain in effect until enactment of statutes on the procedure by which the Russian Gosatomnadzor will issue licenses for the appropriate forms of activity.

1.4. This Statute applies to the issue of temporary permits to enterprises that had been carrying out activities indicated in Article 1.2 prior to its enactment, and to enterprises intending to begin this activity during the effective period of this Statute.

1.5. Issue of a temporary permit is based on:

- an evaluation of the safety of the activity applied for, on the basis of an examination of documents supporting the application and an inspection carried out at the enterprise;
- establishment of the conditions in which the temporary permit will be effective, including requirements on ensuring radiation safety in the course of the enterprise's performance of activity permitted to it.

1.6. The temporary permit is an official document which:

- certifies the enterprise's right to engage in the activity indicated on the temporary permit;
- establishes the conditions that must be fulfilled for the temporary permit to remain effective.

1.7. A temporary permit is issued separately for each of the forms of activity indicated in Article 1.2.

When such a temporary permit is in possession, a separate permit is not required for the following types of work carried out by an enterprise engaging in activity indicated in Article 1.2:

- using radioactive substances in apparatus for industrial measurements;
- carrying out radiographic work using radioactive substances for quality control of equipment and products;
- monitoring the radiation situation;
- transporting radioactive substances, articles made from radioactive substances, and radioactive wastes;
- storing radioactive substances, articles made from radioactive substances, and radioactive wastes.

The temporary permit must indicate the types of work carried out by the enterprise in the course of its permitted activity.

1.8. The production complexes, production sections, shops, storage facilities, and installations or other objects belonging to the enterprise at which permitted activity may be carried on by the enterprise are indicated in the temporary permit.

1.9. A temporary permit is issued to an enterprise established in accordance with the RSFSR law "On Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity," regardless of forms of ownership, which possesses, in accordance with policy established by legislation of the Russian Federation and with the right of full business control, and/or rents property necessary for activities associated with producing, handling, and using radioactive substances and articles made from them, and if the enterprise:

- has appropriately trained personnel certified to do the work;
- observes the principles, criteria, and requirements of radiation safety that the Russian Gosatomnadzor establishes on the basis of its competency through regulations and rules, resolutions, guidelines, and the conditions of the effectiveness of the temporary permit;
- has a radiation safety service, and develops and implements measures to heighten radiation safety;
- observes the requirements of accounting for and monitoring radioactive substances, and ensures fulfillment of the requirements of their physical protection;
- furnishes information to the Russian Gosatomnadzor pertaining to the indicated activity, in a volume and at times established by the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

1.10. A temporary permit remains in effect throughout the entire period indicated on it, if the Russian Gosatomnadzor does not suspend or annul the temporary permit.

1.11. The temporary permit is annulled when the enterprise is liquidated or reorganized.

2. Application for a Temporary Permit

2.1. In order to obtain a temporary permit for activities indicated in Article 1.2, an enterprise submits an application to the Russian Gosatomnadzor and to the Russian Gosatomnadzor's Regional District Administration at the location of the activity for which the permit is applied for (referred to hereinafter as the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor).

The application is submitted separately for each activity indicated in Article 1.2.

2.2. The following documents must accompany the application:

- a request for a temporary permit of format shown in Attachment 1;
- a copy of the enterprise's state registration document;
- a copy of the enterprise's charter;
- copies of documents confirming the right of ownership of, right of complete business control of, and/or

the lease on property necessary for the activity applied for;

- a copy of a document confirming appointment of the enterprise director and his rights;
- the set of documents substantiating the application, listed in Attachment 2;
- a guarantee to pay the expenses of scientific-technical expert examination of documents supporting the application.

2.3. Documents are filled out in accordance with the established requirements, while reporting and reference documents must be signed by the enterprise director. The signature is authenticated by the enterprise seal.

2.4. The application is submitted to the Administration for the Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor so that the submitted documents could be checked for their correspondence to content and format requirements.

2.5. Within 30 days of the date of submission of the application to the Russian Gosatomnadzor, the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor checks the submitted documents and sends written notice of receipt of the application for examination or its rejection to the enterprise and to the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

2.6. The notice is signed by the chief of the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

The notice and application are stored on file by the indicated administration for 10 years.

2.7. The Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor sends a list of representatives of the central administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor that are to participate in a commission conducting an inspection at the enterprise to the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor together with the notice of receipt of the application for examination.

2.8. The reason for rejection is indicated in notices sent regarding a rejected application.

2.9. Examination of an application may be denied:

- if the materials of the application do not satisfy the content and format requirements;
- if the activity applied for is not foreseen by the enterprise's charter.

2.10. When the materials of an application fail to satisfy established requirements, the Russian Gosatomnadzor may establish a time period during which additional materials may be submitted.

2.11. Additional application materials are sent and examined according to the same procedure as the application.

3. Conducting the Inspection

3.1. An inspection is conducted at the enterprise with the purpose of verifying presence and sufficiency of conditions necessary for the enterprise to safely perform the activity for which it is applying.

3.2. The inspection at the enterprise is organized by the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

3.3. The inspection at the enterprise is conducted within 2 months from the date of receipt of the notice of receipt of the application for examination by the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

3.4. The chief (deputy chief) of the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor publishes an order regarding conduct of an inspection at the enterprise on the basis of the notice of receipt of the application for examination.

3.5. The goal and objectives of the inspection are determined, the chairman, deputy chairman, and staff of the inspection commission are approved, and the procedure for drawing up the inspection program and the time for submitting it, the starting and ending times of the commission's work and the deadline for submission of the commission's act are established in the order.

3.6. The inspection program is approved by the chief (deputy chief) of the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

3.7. Representatives of local bodies of government and administration, state public health surveillance agencies and nature conservation agencies at the place where the activity applied for is to be conducted may be asked to participate in the inspection with the consent of the directors of the indicated bodies.

3.8. The commission draws up an act on the basis of the inspection results, which must contain:

- the results of inspecting the organization and conduct of work to ensure the safety of the applied-for activity;
- a list of revealed violations of the requirements of radiation safety regulations and rules;
- an analysis of the correspondence of the actual state of the organization and conduct of work at the enterprise to the materials of the application;
- a conclusion regarding presence and sufficiency of conditions necessary for safe conduct of the activity applied for by the enterprise;
- a recommendation on possible issue of a temporary permit to the enterprise for the activity for which it is applying;
- proposals on including, in the conditions of the temporary permit, requirements on ensuring radiation safety by the enterprise in its conduct of the applied-for activity.

3.9. Within 10 days after conclusion of the work of the commission, the chief (deputy chief) of the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor forwards the act to the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor and to the enterprise.

4. Examination of the Application

4.1. Examination of the application materials is organized and carried out by the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor with the assistance of the Scientific-Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor and the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

4.2. The Administration for Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of Enterprises of the Fuel Cycle of the Russian Gosatomnadzor and the Administration for Supervision of Guarantees of Nonproliferation of Nuclear Technologies, Materials, and Their Physical Protection of the Russian Gosatomnadzor are asked to assist in examination of the materials of an application for activity that includes handling and use of nuclear materials.

4.3. The application materials are examined by a deadline established by the deputy chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor, within 6 months from the day notice of receipt of the application for examination is sent to the enterprise.

4.4. The following are determined during examination of the application materials:

- correspondence of the production procedures utilized to the requirements of the regulations and rules of radiation safety;
- sufficiency of organizational and technical radiation safety measures;
- presence and effectiveness of the system for ensuring quality and reliability of products;
- presence of the corresponding system for storage, accounting, control, and physical protection of radioactive substances;
- presence of the corresponding system of organizational and technical measures regarding the handling of radioactive wastes;
- the list of personnel at facilities at which the applied-for activity is to be conducted, the qualifications of these personnel, and the personnel training and certification system;
- presence of the necessary engineering and technical support to the activity applied for;
- possession, in the established cases, of Russian Gosatomnadzor permits for the applied-for activity by enterprises, organizations, and other legal and physical persons doing jobs for and rendering services to the enterprise in support of the performance of the activity applied for;
- preparedness of accident prevention measures and of plans for accident recovery efforts;
- presence and sufficiency of financial, material, technical, and other resources to support the activity applied for, to eliminate the consequences of possible accidents and to compensate for possible radiation damage.

4.5. In the course of examination of the application materials, decisions may be adopted regarding the need:

- for having the enterprise submit additional documents in support of the applications;
- for carrying out scientific-technical expert examination of the safety of the activity applied for, on the basis of documents supporting the application.

The Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor notifies the enterprise regarding adopted decisions and establishes the deadlines and procedures of their fulfillment.

4.6. Scientific-technical expert examination is carried out on the basis of an agreement with the enterprise by an organization (enterprise) possessing a Russian Gosatomnadzor permit to conduct expert examination of materials and documents with the purpose of evaluating the safety of the corresponding facilities and production operations (technologies) presenting a radiation danger.

4.7. The technical assignment to conduct a scientific-technical expert examination is drawn up by the organization (enterprise) that is to carry out the expert examination.

The technical assignment is coordinated with the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor and the Scientific-Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor, and it is approved by the director (deputy director) of the organization (enterprise) conducting the expert examination.

4.8. A report which must contain the following is drawn up on the basis of the results of the scientific-technical expert examination:

- an analysis of the documents supporting the application, and the results of mathematical and experimental verifications of the submitted justifications;
- conclusions regarding the authenticity and sufficiency of submitted justifications;
- a recommendation on the possibility for issuing a temporary permit to the enterprise for the activity for which it is applying;
- proposals on including, in the conditions of the temporary permit, requirements on ensuring radiation safety during performance of the activity for which the enterprise is applying.

4.9. The report is approved by the director (deputy director) of the organization (enterprise) that carried out the scientific-technical expert examination, and it is sent to the enterprise, to the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor, to the Scientific-Technical Center for Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor, and to the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

4.10. In the event that a scientific-technical expert examination is carried out, the deadline for examining application materials may be extended by a decision of the deputy chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

4.11. The Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor draws up a conclusion on the application on the basis of an examination of the application materials, the inspection act, and the

report of the scientific-technical expert examination. This conclusion contains the results of the evaluation of the safety of the activity applied for and proposals on the possibility for issuing a temporary permit or denying its issue, with the reason for the rejection indicated.

Drafts of the temporary permit and of the conditions of the temporary permit are appended to a conclusion proposing possible issue of the temporary permit.

A draft of the rejection notice, with the reason for rejection indicated, is appended to a conclusion proposing rejection of the issue of a temporary permit.

4.12. The conclusion on the application is approved by the deputy chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor. The conclusion on the application, the inspection act, and the report on the scientific-technical expert examination are stored in files of the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for 10 years.

4.13. Complaints against bodies of the Russian Gosatomnadzor that examine applications and conduct measures associated with this are submitted by the enterprise in the name of the chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

The Russian Gosatomnadzor communicates the results of an examination of a complaint to the enterprise no later than 20 days from the moment of its receipt.

5. Issue of a Temporary Permit

5.1. The decision to issue or deny issue of a temporary permit is made by the chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor on the basis of the approved conclusion on the application.

5.2. The following are grounds for denial of a temporary permit:

- a statement in the conclusion on the application regarding insufficiency or absence of conditions necessary for safe performance of activity by the enterprise for which it is applying;
- presence of information in the application that is distorted or not authentic.

5.3. The temporary permit or the notice of denial of a temporary permit is signed in four copies by the chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor. The signature is authenticated by the seal of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

5.4. The temporary permit is registered with the Affairs Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor in a special journal. A temporary permit is invalid if it has not been awarded a corresponding registration number.

5.5. The Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor sends a temporary permit or a notice of denial of its issue to the enterprise, to the Affairs Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor, and to the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor within 15 days of its signing.

5.6. The format of the temporary permit is shown in Attachment 3.

5.7. One copy each of the temporary permit is stored for 10 years after it expires or it is annulled:

- with the Affairs Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor;
- with the Administration of Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor;
- with the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor at the place where the permitted activity is carried out;
- with the enterprise.

5.8. The Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor sends a copy of the temporary permit to the inspection office responsible for direct supervision over fulfillment of the conditions of the temporary permit.

5.9. The enterprise sends a copy of the temporary permit to the facilities at which the enterprise carries out its permitted activity.

5.10. The Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor submits written notification regarding the issue or denial of the temporary permit to the body of executive government that had registered the enterprise and the body of state public health surveillance that had issued the public health certificates granting the enterprise the right to work with sources of ionizing radiation and certificates on transportation resources.

5.11. A decision by the Russian Gosatomnadzor regarding issue of a temporary permit may be appealed in accordance with the established procedure in court organs of the Russian Federation.

6. Conditions of the Temporary Permit

6.1. The conditions of a temporary permit are attached to the temporary permit and are an inseparable part of it.

6.2. The conditions of a temporary permit are worded by the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

6.3. Disputes arising regarding the wording of the conditions of a temporary permit are examined by the deputy chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

6.4. The conditions of a temporary permit are signed by the chief of the Administration for Supervision of Radiation Safety of the Russian Gosatomnadzor. The signature is authenticated by the Russian Gosatomnadzor's seal.

6.5. In the event that previously unknown factors influencing safety are revealed after a temporary permit is issued, or if the enterprise so requests, the Russian Gosatomnadzor may correct the conditions of the temporary permit.

The procedures for correcting the conditions of a temporary permit are established by the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

6.6. An enterprise that has received a temporary permit is obligated to notify the Russian Gosatomnadzor regarding any violations of the conditions of the temporary permit, and regarding accidents and incidents occurring during the performance of the permitted activity.

6.7. In the event that the enterprise violates the conditions of the temporary permit, the Russian Gosatomnadzor may

suspend the temporary permit until such time that the revealed violations are corrected, or annul the temporary permit.

In this case the enterprise is obligated to terminate the permitted activity, while continuing to bear full responsibility for ensuring radiation safety.

6.8. Transfer of the rights to engage in activity indicated on the temporary permit to any legal or physical persons in any form is considered to be a violation of the conditions of the temporary permit.

6.9. The Russian Gosatomnadzor sends a notice of suspension or annulment of a temporary permit to the enterprise as well as to the body of executive government that registered the enterprise and the body of state public health surveillance that had issued the public health certificates to the enterprise for the right to work with ionizing radiation sources and for transportation resources.

6.10. Supervision over fulfillment of the conditions of the temporary permit is maintained by the Regional District Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor.

Registered by the Scientific-Technical Administration of the Russian Gosatomnadzor on 25 May 1993.

No. 46-93

Order No. 53, 25 May 1993, Moscow, "On Approval of the Statute on Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activities Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them"

BY MY ORDER:

The attached Statute on Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activities Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them shall be approved.

[signed] Chairman of the Russian Gosatomnadzor Yu. G. Vishnevskiy, Russian Federation Ministry of Justice
28 May 1993

Registration Number 263

List of Documents Required for Permit Application

93WN0457B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
10 Jun 93 p 6

[Attachment 2 to the Statute on Procedure for Issuing Temporary Permits of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activities Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them: List of Documents Supporting an Application for Receipt of a Temporary Permit of the Russian Gosatomnadzor for Activity Associated With Producing, Handling, and Using Radioactive Substances and Articles Made From Them]

[Text] 1. A report substantiating the safety of the activity applied for, containing:

- a list of types of radioactive substances, articles made from radioactive substances and/or radioactive wastes that are the object of the activity applied, with

an indication of their quantity, isotope composition, and radioactivity;

- a list and characteristics of facilities at the enterprise presenting a nuclear and radiation danger (production complexes, production sections, shops, storage facilities, installations etc.) at which the activity applied for is conducted;
- a description of the organization of the production process and its technological level (production and testing equipment, the technical and technological monitoring system, and the system for handling the radioactive wastes formed);
- a description of product quality and reliability control systems;
- a description of the basic technical concepts, systems, and resources ensuring radiation safety of production and of products;
- a description of the structure and composition of the radiation safety service at the enterprise;
- a list of documents establishing general and special requirements on ensuring radiation safety of production operations (production procedures) and articles;
- a list of the composition, qualifications, and certifications of personnel at facilities at which the activity applied for is conducted;
- an analysis of the correspondence of the work done to the requirements of technical standards on radiation safety currently in effect;
- a list of deviations from the requirements of standards on radiation safety, and of measures compensating for these deviations;
- the program of work to eliminate deviations from the requirements of technical standards on radiation safety.

2. Copies of the public health certificates granting the right to work with ionizing radiation sources, filled out in accordance with requirements of the "Basic Public Health Regulations of Work With Radioactive Substances and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation OSP-72/87."

3. A copy of a permit (license) issued by nature protection organs for integrated nature use, for burial (storage) of radioactive wastes, and/or for releasing and dumping radioactive substances into the environment (in accordance with the form of activity).

4. Enterprise instructions on ensuring radiation safety.

5. A list of possible radiation accidents.

6. Instructions on preventing accidents and fires and eliminating their consequences.

7. A plan of measures to protect personnel in the event of an accident.

8. Documents confirming presence and sufficiency of financial resources intended to compensate for damages that may be inflicted by the activity applied for upon the health and property of citizens and the surrounding natural environment.

9. Copies of the acts of acceptance of the facilities for operation (in the case of facilities already in operation).

10. Copies of public health certificates for specialized motor vehicles used to convey radioactive substances and materials, devices, and units containing ionizing radiation sources, and radioactive wastes, filled out in accordance with the requirements of the "Basic Public Health Regulations of Work With Radioactive Substances and Other Sources of Ionizing Radiation OSP-72/87."

11. The routes of travel of special motor transportation, coordinated with the State Motor Vehicle Inspectorate which has the enterprise within its service area.

12. Instructions on procedures to be followed in the event of traffic accidents involving special motor transportation.

13. Copies of certificate-permits on transport packaging sets used by the enterprise.

14. A list of enterprises, organizations, and other legal and physical persons doing jobs and rendering services associated with producing, handling, and using radioactive substances and articles made from them in the course of the enterprise's conduct of applied-for activity, with an indication of the nature of the jobs and services.

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Results of DPRK Nuclear Talks

LD1506105593 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 0945 GMT 15 Jun 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 15 Jun—The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomes the results of the United States-North Korean talks that ended in New York on 11 June and which focused on the problem of nuclear safety on the Korean peninsula, according to a statement circulated today by Russia's foreign policy department.

The foreign ministry emphasizes that the joint statement which pledges to refrain from the threat and use of force, to respect each other's sovereignty and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs, to support the peaceful unification of Korea and to apply impartially the full-scale guarantees for the nonnuclear status of the Korean peninsula, which allows room for hoping that one of the serious problems worrying the world community recently will finally be resolved. The DPRK's decision to suspend its departure from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons—in the conditions which have evolved—can be assessed positively. This decision, however, should be regarded as just the first step in the right direction.

In the view of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the course of further contacts with the United States—similar to contacts with the Republic of Korea and the International Atomic Energy Association, [IAEA]—the DPRK should confirm indisputably its participation in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and, as a consequence of this, fully observe the IAEA agreement on guarantees, including the carrying out of international nuclear inspections. In this context, we support the continuation of the American-North Korean dialogue which is aimed at seeking compromise solutions with a view to a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. For its part,

Russia confirms that it is ready to subscribe to the guarantees of nuclear states with respect to Korea should this question come on the agenda.

Missile Forces Commander in Chief on START II Issues

PM1606162393 Moscow *ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI*
in Russian 16 Jun 93 p 7

[Interview with Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, by Sergey Ovsiyenko; date and place of interview not given: "START II: Parity Is Possible and Attainable"]

[Text] [Ovsiyenko] For six months now disputes have not abated over the START II Treaty. It seemed that in this time it was possible to reach a specific view of the agreement which has been signed. But no, different opinions on this problem are constantly arising. Do you personally, Igor Dmitriyevich, have doubts that the treaty will be ratified in the Russian parliament?

[Sergeyev] I believe this problem must be looked at from the following angle. I am concerned by the attitude displayed toward it by the republics of the former Union on whose territories there are still nuclear weapons. For instance, Belarus has met its commitments in full and has ratified the Lisbon protocol. Kazakhstan has ratified the treaty but not the Lisbon protocol. Ukraine has done neither, evidently counting on becoming a nuclear power.

It is not ruled out that this complex situation will affect the process of the START II Treaty's ratification in the Russian parliament. Complexities are arising not so much in Russia as beyond its borders.

[Ovsiyenko] If we return to the stance adopted by Ukraine, I want to recall the quite recent words of President Leonid Kravchuk to the effect that the republic's potential does not allow it to keep nuclear weapons on its territory.

[Sergeyev] So far it is only the president who is saying this, not the Ukrainian parliament which, in my view, is holding futile hearings on this question.

That Ukraine possesses a substantial scientific and technical potential is borne out by the following fact: On its territory (Dnepropetrovsk and Pavlograd) are two of the three plants for the production of missiles of the latest, fourth generation. In Russia there is one such plant, in Votkinsk. Ukraine used to produce the entire operational guidance and control system and targeting system...

[Ovsiyenko] In your opinion did the Ukrainian president have in mind the republic's economic potential?

[Sergeyev] Evidently, that is...

[Ovsiyenko] Nonetheless, Igor Dmitriyevich, what is your view of the Russian parliament's stance on the START II Treaty?

[Sergeyev] It seems to me that our parliament with the aid of military and other experts realizes that the treaty's ratification is essential. After all, under the conditions of the present economic situation it is simply impossible to restore in its full volume the production of missiles which

used to be manufactured in Ukraine. But by ratifying the treaty we shall be able to achieve a certain parity with the United States.

[Ovsiyenko] The treaty's opponents justify their stance by the allegedly excessive expenditure on the fulfillment of its terms. What would you say to that?

[Sergeyev] Our institute, which studies not only the problems of Russia's missile troops but also of its strategic forces in general, has worked on about 200 versions of the START II Treaty. And what is now being discussed is the best for Russia.

[Ovsiyenko] Igor Dmitriyevich, as far as I know the troops are being set tasks for eliminating the missiles. Is that fair?

[Sergeyev] You know that the strategic missile forces units lack personnel yet we are also being charged with destroying the missiles.

[Ovsiyenko] But who could do that?

[Sergeyev] I believe those ministries which created them, or enterprises of those departments. For instance, the plants of the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building could carry out the dismantling [rablokirovka] of nuclear warheads and extract the plutonium...

This is a repeat of the story of the treaty on intermediate- and short-range missiles when they sought "clean" methods of eliminating them but could think up nothing except the explosion of 1,000 kg of TNT under the missile. Later they decided to destroy them by the launch method but the Americans immediately set a quota—no more than 72 missiles. They were afraid we would start to develop an ABM system with these launches. We did this (however hard for us) to convince ourselves we were standing guard with reliable weapons. At exactly the appointed time without delays or disruptions the missiles were launched in the Chita region...

We shall not destroy a single missile that has not passed its guaranteed service life. It will work off the funds spent on its production and only after that will it be eliminated.

[Ovsiyenko] Since the treaty the missile forces have been mainly emphasizing the "Topol" system. Why?

[Sergeyev] These complexes accord with the terms of the treaty whereby there should not be destabilizing missile systems on the ground. Included among them are those which have MIRV's on one delivery system. Single-warhead systems are included in the relevant agreements, they do not prompt the opponent to destroy them.

[Ovsiyenko] What analogs to our present complexes do the Americans have?

[Sergeyev] The famous "Minuteman" missiles which the Americans regularly modernize. Beginning with "Minuteman 1" they have now completed the modernization of the "Minuteman-3," creating an entirely new system. This is very advantageous when a missile on alert duty is improved by degrees. As a result a missile of a previous system has new specifications for its warheads and data input systems... And that is nothing other than a new complex.

In contrast to the Americans with a persistence worthy of better application we have created new types of missiles which compared with preceding ones had small qualitative additions. But they were new missiles with a new identification number, with new Lenin and State Prize winners... We did not develop the infrastructure—the system of operational control and guidance—which undoubtedly would have provided more advantages than the creation of a new type of missile. After all, what would have been developed would have been not a single missile but an entire complex.

[Ovsiyenko] In addition to the "Topol" Russia has missile systems on rail platforms...

[Sergeyev] They are also on alert duty but the present military-political situation is such that in the view of the military command there is no need for their presence on combat patrol routes. They are at their permanent deployment locations and can be put on a combat patrol route as soon as the need arises. I should add that these missile complexes can also fulfill missions from their permanent deployment locations.

[Ovsiyenko] Does the fulfillment of alert duty tasks presuppose that we have a specific enemy?

[Sergeyev] Right now we have no permanent enemies. Previously we knew that such an enemy existed on the northern air and space salient and targeting plans against him were compiled. But now a target could appear at zero degrees and at 180, 270, and 360 degrees... Hence the demand for the appropriate weapons: They must be mobile and not only preach [as published] a massive nuclear missile strike. They must be flexible not as regards the launch plan but, for instance, in correcting the missile's flight path.

[Ovsiyenko] The military reform presupposes the creation of absolutely new Russian armed forces, on a different principled basis. What are the paths of the further development of the Strategic Missile Forces?

[Sergeyev] At the third stage of building of the Russian army strategic forces will appear which will integrate the missile forces and Air Force and Navy nuclear forces. After all, reform means optimizing the army structures.

[Ovsiyenko] It is not a case of abolishing the Strategic Missile Forces as a category of troops?

[Sergeyev] Strategic forces are being created. But on what basis is another matter. The missile forces have a developed system of operational control and a high degree of combat readiness. Perhaps that will be taken into account.

[Ovsiyenko] In the sixties the missile troops were a political cudgel with which the USSR instilled terror into potential and nonpotential enemies. What tasks now face the Strategic Missile Forces?

[Sergeyev] If we admit that our army has been depoliticized then one task remains: a high degree of combat readiness, nuclear safety, and the solution of the social problems which, as throughout the Russian army, are based on the shortage of housing for the servicemen.

French TV Report on 'Murmansk-150' Nuclear Submarine Base

LD1206172693

[Editorial Report] Paris France-2 Television Network in French at 0000 GMT on 12 June carries the 62-minute recorded "Envoye Special" program, with this edition entitled "Red October." Reception is good.

This "exclusive" report is from the secret "Murmansk-150" nuclear base in Russia, not far from the Norwegian border. The announcer notes that the film crew was allowed inside the base and inside a submarine but with restrictions on filming. Interviews with officers, sailors, and civilians were also allowed. A nuclear alert exercise was also filmed.

The commander of the base, Anatoliy Tisetskiy, is interviewed at length throughout the program. Asked at one point in the interview about his political preferences, the commander says he would defend democracy. When asked what he would do in the case of civil war, he says that this is a tough question to answer and that he has not thought about it yet.

The following people are interviewed during the program:

—A driver at the base, Oleg Schakhmoradov, who reveals to the crew the nuclear dumping site not far from the base and talks about the absence of radioactivity safety regulations at the base. The announcer then notes:

"Our report takes a dramatic turn. Oleg, the driver who allowed us to discover the nuclear dumping site for the (Andrievka) base, died a few hours after talking to us. Heart attack, said the official version. Perhaps true, perhaps untrue. True or untrue, the rule of the system does not allow them to think."

—Captain Leonid Didikin, who notes that the base is the most important one in Russia. He was filmed on duty.

—Two local female doctors at the base, who say they cannot voice their fears about health and safety regulations because they do not want to put their officer husbands in a difficult situation.

Asked whether they know about the level of radioactivity, one of them says: "Here we have a newspaper called ZAPADNAYA LITSA, which tried in vain to carry out an inquiry on this subject. Following that episode, the local radio repeatedly said that the level of radioactivity was normal."

Asked if they think all of this is untrue, one of the doctors says: "Of course, we repeatedly suffer from nosebleeds and bad headaches." Asked why they don't protest, one of them says: "Because we are all married to Navy officers or sailors. We don't want to create problems at work for them. A protest can be ended in a simple way." She asks the cameraman: "Are you still recording?" She then says: "They would simply put a machine gun near every door. End of protest, end of strike, and we would be fired within 24 hours!"

—Two former officers, Sergiy Dognikov and Viktor Razumov, who served at the base and resigned from the Navy over their disagreement with the military establishment over safety matters.

—The former wife of an officer who is still living near the base with her children. She talks about the loneliness of women and children and the health problems at the base.

The program ends with a studio interview with reporter Basile Gregoriyev, who speaks in Russian with a simultaneous translation into French, and a French former submarine commander on their impressions on the film. The report was apparently made by a Russian crew, although the announcer does not say so specifically at the beginning.

Yeltsin Aide Urges Continued N-Test Freeze

PM1606152593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Jun 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Aleksey Yablokov, adviser to Russian president: "Russia Must Uphold Moratorium on Nuclear Tests"]

[Text] The moratorium on nuclear tests adopted by Russia, the United States, and France (and, in fact, by Britain, which conducted its tests on a site in the United States) expires 1 July 1993. "Russia was the initiator of the moratorium on nuclear tests, to which the United States and France later subscribed. We are prepared to extend our moratorium if the United States does not resume its tests," reads a statement by B. Yeltsin disseminated 4 June.

The announcement of the moratorium did not halt but exacerbated the struggle between supporters and opponents of the continuation of nuclear tests both in Russia and in other nuclear powers. I will remind you of some aspects of this dispute. Special parliamentary hearings were held in the Russian Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1992, and a group of people's deputies visited the Russian nuclear test site on Novaya Zemlya's southern island at the beginning of October 1992. On 13 October 1992 the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources completed the first stage of a state expert ecological appraisal of the site. Soon after, the Supreme Soviet Presidium adopted a special decision on the need to continue the state expert ecological appraisal of the Novaya Zemlya nuclear test site and advocated turning most of Novaya Zemlya into a national nature park.

At the end of 1992 the Ministry of Atomic Energy published an unprecedented review of data on the nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, and at the beginning of this year the International Research Institute in Oslo used a detailed analysis of aerospace photographs to convincingly refute our nuclear testers' claims that there have been no serious geological changes at the test sites. Finally, an outstanding event of recent days was an appeal by a group of Russian military men directly involved in past tests, demanding that the nuclear powers completely end all tests forever.

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons expires in 1995, and the world community will be faced full-square with the task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons among states which are not officially members of the nuclear club. Israel, the Republic of South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are now named among states which have their own nuclear weapons or the capability. A whole number of other

countries, to say the least, have the technical potential for this. It is not hard to assume that the resumption of tests of nuclear weapons in the United States and the start of such tests in Russia (until now Russia has never conducted tests, for this was done by the USSR) will not, to put it mildly, help to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation setup.

In recent weeks increasingly definite information has been coming out of the United States that President Clinton advocates not renewing the moratorium on nuclear explosions after 1 July this year. At the same time it is pointed out that the United States plans to conduct quite a few explosions—several a year—but by 1996 it intends to end tests entirely and forever. It is clear that this stand of the U.S. President attests to tremendous pressure on him on the part of military circles. But let us recall that our nuclear weapons experts demand precisely the same thing of the Russian president (as borne out by the president's Edict No. 194 of 27 February 1992 on preparations to conduct nuclear tests in the event of the ending of the moratorium).

It turns out that both the Russian military and the U.S. military are amazingly synchronously and equally interested in the start of tests. It was possible somehow to understand this situation when our countries were rivals in the Cold War and potential enemies. But now that we speak repeatedly and at the highest level of a partnership in relations between Russia and the United States, it is impossible to explain this new nuclear confrontation sensibly, from a panhuman viewpoint.

There is a simple and apparently true explanation: Tests are needed not so much to strengthen the combat might of countries as to support the nuclear sector and the associated military sector.

The chief arguments in favor of resuming nuclear tests are claims that it is necessary to check the safety of existing nuclear weapons and desirable to develop new types (including "ecologically clean" types) of nuclear weapons. Both arguments are disputed—convincingly, in my view—by opponents of the continuation of tests.

Two new aspects of the problem of nuclear tests which had not hitherto attracted proper attention have emerged very recently. The first of them concerns the ecological consequences of nuclear explosions on Novaya Zemlya. It has been shown that the reindeer which lived on Novaya Zemlya's southern island during the testing period experienced a radiation charge many times greater than those alive now, after those tests were stopped. Evidently, the radioactive gases given off during tests could have been the only source of that charge.

The second problem is purely political and also very serious. The commencement of our nuclear tests could face both Ukraine and Kazakhstan with the need to revise their "nuclear relations" with Russia.

All this attests, it seems to me, that Russia must definitely extend its moratorium on nuclear tests, thereby making an attempt to make it permanent and worldwide. This is demanded by the interests of our national security and the security of the whole world.

Radioactive Materials Smuggling on Rise

93WP0179A Moscow *FEDERATSIYA* in Russian No 63, 8 Jun 93 (signed to press 07 Jun 93) p 3

[Article by Mikhail Borisov: "'Radiation' Crime; It Was Begotten by Our Scandalous Unconcern, Which Is Akin to the Crime Itself"]

[Text] Today, the word "radiation" appears more and more frequently on the pages of newspapers, it can be heard in radiobroadcasts, and it is uttered by television announcers. It would seem that this is quite explicable: The accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station], the tragic incidents at the Mayak production association that were publicized, and other facts from our past, and, indeed, our present as well, are the reason for this.

And, generally, as soon as humanity entered the epoch of the "atom," knowledge of radioactivity, radiation dosages, levels of radiation, units of measurement, rules for handling radioactive substances, precautionary measures, hygiene, and so on, were widely popularized. Society's literacy was always evaluated highly, and the steady development of science and technology only elevated its role. However, I want to touch on that aspect of the subject that is frequently ignored. So....

In August of last year in Moscow, four persons (their names are being withheld until the investigation is terminated) were arrested with a very dangerous cargo: cesium-137. The radioactive isotope that was confiscated from the "couriers," as was reported by officials of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation, "was enough to destroy our multimillion capital three times over." As is well known, cesium-137 is considered one of the most radioactive products of nuclear reactions. Its half-life period is about 30 years. Those arrested had arrived in Moscow from Krasnodar. The investigation has yet to clarify how they got the cesium, what it was intended for, who the recipient of the "cargo" was, and other details concerning this very unusual affair.

However, is this unusual? Unfortunately, there are too many cases of "nuclear theft." The theft by unknown persons of a 100-kilogram container with the radioactive nuclide cesium-137 by unknown persons became known not long ago. This happened at the Guryev oil refining plant (Atyrau Oblast). And once again the question: For whom and why was the lethal source of radiation, with a power of about 10 roentgens per hour, necessary?

Let us assume that the version on "fortuitous" theft is correct. But how can this be correlated with the fact that both the repository itself and the container have (in any case, they should have) warning inscriptions and designations? The thieves could not help but know that they were dealing with a very dangerous substance. Another supposition: The cesium-137 was stolen for sale abroad. But then also the criminality of the act is obvious.

We also recall a story which occurred in the city of Kramatorsk that chills the heart. An ampoule with cesium-137 "lost" at the Karan granite quarry became the cause of a horrible tragedy: Children were dying from radiation sickness. The court pronounced its sentence, and those who were guilty of criminal negligence were punished. But are we correct in saying that all of this is only ridiculous

accidents that can be attributed to the irresponsibility of individual persons? No, the situation is much worse than it would seem at first glance. Reports of lost or stolen radioisotopes are coming from various corners of the CIS. The losses are being sought, but they are not always found in time. But this means that the invisible murderous ray is doing its frightening work.

It appears that 1992 was not the year of the monkey, as Eastern calendars asserted, but the year of "radioactive unconcern"—more accurately, of radioactive crime. Here are the facts. In August, six units containing sources of powerful radiation were missing from the dry-milling section of the Kingisepp phosphorite association. One more unit was stolen in September, and this was later followed by the disappearance of an apparatus with a "nuclear filler." Five more units were stolen in October....

The loss of radioactive elements at Lenfilm, a theft in Bratsk, sources of radiation at a garbage dump on Baltiyskaya Street in Moscow, near the 1905 Street metro station....

And here is another report: "In the cities of Izhevsk and Glazov, organs of security and Gossanepidemnadzor [Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety] confiscated from private persons about 95 kilograms of Uranium-238 stolen at the Cheletskiy mechanical plant.... Measures are being taken on the identification of exposed persons and medical observation."

"During the conduct of gamma readings of Barnaul, employees of the enterprise Berezovsk-Geologiya discovered a radioactive source in a Moskvich car, license No. 1773 AB, in the form of rear red reflex reflectors [kafatfov] with a power dosage of 35,500 microroentgens per hour...."

I will remind you: If a person in a short time, say, in an hour, receives a radiation dose of 400 roentgens, then it can be said with a probability of 50 percent that it is lethal.

Other cases are also known that are difficult to conceive, but which, nonetheless, are facts of our existence. In January of last year, there was a report of a certain scum who, for reasons of personal revenge, stole a radioactive isotope from a mine in the city of Donetsk and placed it under the chair of his boss. Fortunately, the scoundrel was quickly exposed. This incident was called a case with a happy ending, and this, unquestionably, is so. But how incidental was the deed? After all, only two years ago, there was a sensational investigation in the Mytishchi municipal court, where a certain Obruchnikov, who had stolen radioactive materials, lied artfully about their appearance in his home.

Isotope technologies are very widespread, and this is also a reality of the times. But we cannot say where to expect the next misfortune. You will agree that all of these cases have one thing in common: The country has practically no reliable (if not to say none at all) control over the industrial storage and use of radioactive materials. For how long is it possible to treat this so carelessly?

The press has reported that specialized patrols of Gosekotsentr [state ecological center] find from 50 to 80 and more dangerous radioactive radiation locations on the territory of Moscow. Until recent times, all materials on such

"finds" were considered top secret and were concealed from the broad public. Although, to be fair, it must be said that each of these was immediately reported to the local authorities, civil defense, and other departments that are supposed to know and that take appropriate measures.

I am not raising doubts about the efficiency of these subunits in eliminating discovered threats. Professionally trained specialists know how and what should be done in such situations. The question is about something else: about mass consciousness and mass control. By no means everyone clearly understands just what radiation danger is. It gives no warning about itself either through sound, smell, or painful sensation. As for individual dosimetric monitoring, it also is at a "zero level," because there is no mass production of simple and accessible monitoring instruments.

We often hear about the actions of foreign terrorists. Daring political murders, seizure of hostages, hijacking of aircraft and sea-going vessels, explosions, arson, and horrible pictures of destruction, blood, and death.... I repeat: This is in their country. Up until recently, our homegrown criminal groups were in the background, behind in "the sins of the other world." Meanwhile, there are many of them, they are growing, they are acquiring experience, and they are ready for any kind of crime for the sake of getting rich, for revenge, and the like. Today, we are standing on the threshold of "nuclear terrorism and blackmail." In any case, the cited facts lead to conclusions like this.

Lastly, and, perhaps, the main thing. If no law appears to stop "nuclear banditry," it is not that our puny law enforcement system will not be able to control it, it will not even succeed in registering the crimes that are being committed. However, this is only one aspect of the problem. An increase in this kind of activity could entail the most frightening consequences, it could end up with the seizure of an AES or a nuclear waste repository and the blackmail of the entire nation....

Let us think about it. After all, we are living under the Damoclean sword of radiation.

UKRAINE

Ukraine Refutes Sale of Warheads to PLO

934K1511A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian
15 Jun 93 p 2

[Statement by Dmytro Tabachnyk, press secretary of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers, issued on 4 June 1993; place not given]

[Text] The newspaper AL-KABBAS, which comes out in Moscow in Arabic and Russian—and subsequently the Israeli-based, Russian-language newspapers NOVOSTI NEDELI and NASHA STRANA—published a report alleging that Ukraine sold two nuclear warheads for \$30 million to the Palestine Resistance Movement. And although the above-mentioned item—drawn from sources close to the Palestine Liberation Organization—asserts that the Palestinians lack any means whatsoever for servicing nuclear warheads or putting them into action (an assertion which—by and of itself—casts great doubts upon the veracity of the report), the information as a whole is presented as an actual fact.

In connection with these undoubted falsifications, I have been fully authorized to state that Ukraine has never sold—nor has any intention of selling—any nuclear warheads to anyone, including the Palestinians.

Back in 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine, whereas the matter of strategic-type warheads is now being decided by the Ukrainian Supreme Council and other high levels of our state. The responsibility for this groundless information, which casts a shadow on our republic's peace-loving policy and the further development of Ukrainian-Israeli relations and does not help the cause of arriving at a peaceful settlement of problems in the Near East, lies fully on the above-mentioned publication.

The Press Service of the Ukrainian Embassy in Israel has taken appropriate steps to rectify the falsifications involved in the above-mentioned matter.

At present the Juridical Service within the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers is studying the matter of securing a court summons against the newspaper AL-KABBAS for disseminating libelous information which is injurious to Ukraine's authority.

[Signed] Dmytro Tabachnyk, press secretary, Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers
14 June 1993

Zlenko Speaks at North Atlantic Meeting in Athens

LD1206222793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 12 Jun 93

[Text] A meeting has been held in Athens of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, including NATO member states, states of the former Warsaw Bloc, and also the countries' legal successors of the former Soviet Union. A final document adopted on the results of the meeting by the ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council speaks, in particular, about the need to elaborate an effective mechanism of peace actions under the aegis of the United Nations Organization and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The foreign ministers stress that all problems which now emerge in the process of democratic transformations in Europe should be tackled solely through peaceful negotiations.

Ukraine's Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko delivered a speech on political issues and issues of security. He drew the attention of the meeting participants to the illegal actions of the Russian Federation with regard to the Black Sea Fleet and also to the problems existing in relations between Ukraine and Russia, as far as the Black Sea Fleet division is concerned. At the proposal of the Ukrainian delegation the ministers considered the situation which has taken shape at the Black Sea Fleet. A significant part of the meeting participants, in particular the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Belgium, and others, supported the stand taken by Ukraine.

As a result of the discussion, in their final document the participants in the Athens meeting spoke out unanimously in support of practical steps toward settling the existing contradictions between Russia and Ukraine on issues of

the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons, in compliance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and international law, and in the spirit of goodneighborly relations.

Due to the obstinate stand of the Russian delegation a provision on respect of territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders was exempt from the text. Such a stand evoked the explicable indignation of the participants in the Athens meeting. In the capital of Greece the foreign minister of Ukraine met NATO's Secretary General Manfred Woerner, and also had a conversation with the foreign minister of the Netherlands and the U.S. secretary of state.

Deputy Chairman of Parliament Says START I Will Be Ratified

AU1506181993 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
12 Jun 93 p 2

[Statement by the Press Service of Ukraine's Supreme Council: "The Dialogue Is Becoming Uninterrupted"]

[Text] On 10 June, First Deputy Chairman of Ukraine's Supreme Council Vasyl Vasylyovych Durdynets received John Hardt [name as transliterated], associate director of the U.S. Congress Research Service.

The conversation, which proceeded in an atmosphere of sincere respect and mutual understanding, was a continuation of the dialogue and businesslike cooperation that have become practically uninterrupted.

Vasyl Vasylyovych Durdynets briefed the guest on the entire spectrum of practical deeds and problems that the parliament of independent Ukraine had to deal with. It is precisely parliament that has become the state's political rostrum, and it is open to all. Legislators must elaborate, first and foremost and in front of everybody, laws and other legal documents on the most acute questions, documents that are so necessary for building Ukrainian statehood. These documents will ensure a consecutive and steady movement of our state and society, starting from changes in the social foundations, which are being undermined by steps towards the market that are not always properly weighed, and ending with such problems as the country's internal and external security and the establishment of order in the state. Today, concluded Vasyl Vasylyovych, we have enough problems: From preparing for the ratification of START I to resolving problems associated with the exacerbation of the social and political situation in connection with the beginning of the undeclared miners' strike. Parliament must again look for legal ways to relieve tensions.

John Hardt expressed his satisfaction with the information he had received and an understanding of the objective conditions in which the parliament of new Ukraine has to function. The guest returned to the theme that was touched upon by Vasyl Vasylyovych Durdynets on START I and on Ukraine's acquiring a nuclear-free status. He was pleased with the information that a working group of deputies created by the Ukraine Parliament has already held a meeting and worked out a procedure for further work on the draft decree concerning these questions. He also advanced proposals on possible trends of cooperation between the U.S. Congress Research Service and Ukraine's Supreme Council and its secretariat.

Nuclear Missile Stance Viewed by Russia

PM1506133593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Jun 93 First Edition p 4

[Article by Vladimir Nadein: "America by Hook, Russia by Crook; Two Approaches to a Nuclear Missile Ukraine"]

[Text] Through its defense minister Russia has expressed dissatisfaction at U.S. interference in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the future of the 176 ICBM's which used to belong to the Soviet Union and which have remained on Ukrainian territory. General Grachev has told the Americans that, first, these missiles are Russia's property and, second, that Russia and Ukraine will sort it all out for themselves.

The general's two theses are too contentious to build a long-term political installation on. That is why U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin addressed a few sympathetic sighs to his Russian counterpart before setting off for Kiev and concluding an agreement which some U.S. newspapers have already called a giant step in the right direction.

Something for Everyone

The agreement concerns not so much even the missiles as the 1,240 nuclear warheads for them. Experiencing justified horror in the face of the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons, Washington suggested that all these warheads, after being removed from the missiles, should not be removed to Russia, as previously envisaged by multilateral accords, but should remain on Ukrainian territory. But temporarily, and under international control.

Kiev agreed. To all appearances it was attracted by the prospect of obtaining \$2.8 billion for the nuclear fuel extracted from Ukrainian missiles and reprocessed at U.S. enterprises. Previously it was believed that the reprocessing would take place in Russia, so that the Ukrainians saw the prospects of compensation as involving rubles to too great an extent.

The opinion that Washington, to the detriment of the other republics of the former Union, has become too obsessed with the exclusive importance of Russia is regarded in Kiev in general as justified and as irrefutable in the nuclear missile sphere. People here well remember the words of the previous U.S. President, George Bush, about "suicidal nationalism." Nor have they forgotten the spring of 1992, when Bush forged straight ahead, seeking agreement to serious talks from the four envious, unfriendly, mutual suspicious heirs to the USSR's nuclear might.

The result of the Lisbon conference in May last year was the signing by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan of the nonproliferation treaty and the agreement on the gradual dismantling and removal to Russia of Soviet nuclear missile weapons and the accession of all three to the list of nonnuclear states. The eagerness with which admission to the "nuclear-free club" is proceeding is borne out by the sluggish process of ratification. Only Belarus has completed it without reservations.

Of course, Bush was pursuing U.S. national interests and using the carrot and the stick to get the new presidents to renounce the nuclear status which had descended on them. But outwardly it looked as though it was a bias in favor of

Moscow. Many people in Kiev assess B. Clinton's agreement to the Vancouver meeting in just the same way, believing that the Ukrainian president needs no less Western support than the Russian president. And is no less deserving of it.

Someone Else's Football

Explaining the recent appointment of Aviation Marshal Shaposhnikov as secretary of the Security Council, B. Yeltsin said: "The nuclear forces are being transferred to Russia and to Russian jurisdiction."

Only six months ago the Russian president would probably have preferred to refrain from this direct statement. Today the wind of events is throwing up onto the Russian shore all the supercomplicated combat equipment with which the new nuclear powers simply cannot cope.

Ukrainian General Volodymyr Tolubko, well known for his radical nationalist feelings (not to be confused with his uncle, the late V.F. Tolubko, commander in chief of the USSR strategic missile forces) said in a telephone conversation with a Western correspondent: "Do you know what the word 'idiots' means? Idiots are people who give up their nuclear weapons of their own accord."

It sounds good. But President L. Kravchuk, Ukrainian Foreign Minister A. Zlenko, and Defense Minister K. Morozov, who advocate a restrained nuclear policy for their country, were most likely right to give a different definition. For instance: Idiots are people who obstinately close their eyes to the obvious consequences of their actions.

Addressing a session of the Supreme Rada, Anatoliy Zlenko warned legislators that the refusal to observe the agreements which have been signed will not only create in the West an image of Ukraine as an unreliable partner but will also lead "to the reduction of economic ties and a trade embargo or even blockade." There is no doubt that President Kravchuk was also speaking with the minister's voice.

Better than anyone L. Kravchuk knows how close he is to acquiring "positive control" over strategic weapons. That is to the opportunity not only of blocking but also of launching missiles themselves. The president constantly says that his country does not need this, but he does not deny his scientists' ability to fit keys to the electromagnetic locks of the missiles in Ukraine. Russian and American experts agree that the Ukrainians need approximately six months to be completely free of Moscow's "football."

The White House believes that it must turn to face Ukraine immediately, because time will not wait.

Race Against Time

Russia is also relying on the inexorability of time, but it is drawing the opposite conclusions from this, to wit that in approximately six months it will become obvious to the Ukrainians themselves that keeping the nuclear missile potential safe is a pleasure which Kiev simply cannot afford. Neither now nor in the foreseeable future.

Proceeding to all appearances from the thesis that idiots are people who pay for what they could get for nothing, the

Russians are suggesting to the Americans that they refrain from any actions, allowing events to take their natural course.

Of course, behind this advice there lies not only concern for the U.S. taxpayers' money. The agreement concluded by Les Aspin in Kiev contains a number of questions to which not even its authors can yet give the answer. Analyzing the situation which is taking shape after the positioning of nuclear missiles in Ukraine under international control, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL puts these questions like this: "What will happen if Ukraine suddenly decides it wants access to the warheads? Will the guard of international forces shoot at the people who want to take them? Must there be a vote in the United Nations to remove the warheads from this guard? Who will have the right to put them back on the missiles?"

Reward for Disobedience

To these important problems we should add those which directly affect Russia's interests as a nuclear state. Ukraine did not consult with Russia either before or during Les Aspin's visit. Yet the dismantling of former Soviet missiles under international control will turn into public property the secret codes, electromagnetic designs, and much else which is an important secret and has its own very high price for Russia.

Finally, one must consider the effect of the "reward for disobedience." In rewarding Ukraine for refusing to observe the accords signed in Lisbon Washington must consider the attention with which Minsk and Almaty are following the growth of the nuclear trading. Here too there are wits among the generals. And if jokes about idiots are paid for so dearly in hard currency then both capitals may think up something comical. In both form and content.

Government Insists on Russia Paying for Nuclear Warheads

LD1406221793 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 14 Jun 93

[Text] Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma received Wim Kok, deputy prime minister and minister of finance of the Kingdom of Netherlands, who came to Kiev on 14 June at the head of his country's official government delegation. Leonid Kuchma informed Wim Kok about the economic situation in Ukraine, noting that, under conditions in which Russia is increasing the prices of energy sources monthly, it is very difficult for the government to pursue the course of market reforms.

He also clarified the Ukrainian Government's stance on the issue of the START 1 Treaty ratification. The complexity of the situation lies in the fact that, as soon as Ukraine ratifies the treaty, according to international law, nuclear warheads on Ukraine's territory will automatically become Russia's property without any monetary compensation. That is why the Ukrainian Government has placed a condition on signing an agreement whereby Russia would undertake to supply Ukraine with nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations or to pay for the warheads. However, the media in Moscow is distorting the Ukrainian Government's position, seeing political, not economic, motives behind it.

Article Stresses Concern About Potential Nuclear Threat

AU1406180393 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
11 Jun 93 p 10

[Article by Romulus Caplescu: "Ukraine's Finger on the Nuclear Trigger"]

[Text] "Do you know what an idiot is? An idiot is a person who renounces the nuclear weapons he possesses." These words belong to General Tolubko who, for a long time, held a high-powered position within the strategic missile forces of the former USSR and who is now one of the frontrankers of the nationalist groups within the Ukrainian Parliament; and—briefly put—this is one of the most pressing concerns of international authorities, primarily of the governments in Washington and Moscow.

And indeed, at this point there are 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) equipped with 1,240 nuclear ogives [ogive] on Ukrainian territory; to these we can add 400-600 nuclear bombs that can be launched from planes. Thus, this is a total of almost 2,000 nuclear warheads that would permit the Ukraine to become—in case control over them will be instituted—the third biggest nuclear power, after the United States and Russia, capable of destroying any hostile target on the globe. For the time being, however, this horrifying destructive potential is—in conformity with existing understandings—under the control of the Russian strategic forces commander who is in possession of the codes that are needed to launch these nuclear missiles. According to experts, however, Ukrainian scientists will be able to "break" these codes in a short time—in a few months or one to two years. The moment this control can be taken over by Kiev, one of the most serious international crises during the entire period following the Cold War may emerge, a crisis compared with which the conflicts in former Yugoslavia may seem mere child's play.

Thus, a country lacking political experience, which has just won its independence after centuries of foreign domination, a country with a nationalist regime in power and which is directly bordering on the former dominating and potentially hostile power—Russia—could, all of a sudden, find itself—like the sorcerer's apprentice—in the possession of an immense force capable of unleashing a world catastrophe.

This scenario is far from belonging to the realm of fantasy. It is a reality like during the time of the defunct USSR; not only were the said nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of the Ukraine, but an important plant for the manufacture of codified missile control electronic devices is located there, as are computerized installations for the purpose of programming these devices. On the other hand, aside from "excited" military people like General Tolubko, an increasing number of Ukrainian politicians, including Prime Minister Kuchma, favor the preservation of these nuclear weapons. These are sufficient reasons to entitle American analysts to view the controversy over the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal as "one of the most sensitive foreign policy issues confronting the Clinton administration" (WASHINGTON POST) and, at the same time, as "a serious problem for Russia and, in general, a problem of serious concern for all the neighboring countries of Ukraine."

This explains the discussions conducted these days in Kiev by U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the assurances he has been given, including the promise to ratify the START I Treaty, without which the Russian-U.S. nuclear disarmament convention would become null and void. One cannot exclude the hypothesis that Ukraine may resort to a sort of blackmail in order to obtain—if eventually it renounces nuclear weapons—a high price in the form of financial compensations and guarantees for security against a possible Russian attack; it seems, however, that the offer of "defensive partnership" made by Washington to Kiev is considered insufficient. Neither has Chancellor Kohl, who has also visited the Ukrainian capital, been more successful.

Ministry Denies Ostankino Information on Nuclear Facilities

*AU1506135793 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
12 Jun 93 p 1*

[Unattributed statement: "The Canards Season Is on Again"]

[Text] On 7 June, while commenting on U.S. Defense Minister Les Aspin's official visit to Ukraine, the "Ostankino" Television Company alleged that there is no money in Ukraine not only for disarmament but also for maintaining its nuclear missile complexes. "For one and a half years, no money has been allocated for conducting scheduled work, and Ukraine's Ministry of Defense does not allow Russian specialists to visit these facilities," asserted the Russian Television Company. However, the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense stated that this information is yet another piece of misinformation.

Ukraine has not ceased to finance the servicing and maintenance of nuclear facilities on its territory. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense has allocated 700 million rubles to finance warranted and authors' supervision by Russian specialists.

The statement emphasizes that over the period of existence of Ukraine's Armed Forces, there has not been a single case when experts or specialists of the Russian Federation would not be admitted to nuclear missile facilities.

Zlenko Calls for Help in Denuclearization

*AU1606132193 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
16 Jun 93 p 3*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko by Burkhard Bischof; place and date not given: "Otherwise We Would Have To Sell Uranium"]

[Text] [Bischof] Mr. Foreign Minister, in Copenhagen you recently warned the Western states against exerting pressure on Ukraine regarding the ratification of the first treaty on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons (START I). What was the reason for that?

[Zlenko] We have found that pressure by some nuclear powers on Ukraine tend to be counterproductive. Pressure is simply not the right way in this matter to persuade

Ukraine to take a certain step. We are calling for cooperation, understanding, and a common language in order to solve the acute problem of ratifying and implementing the START Treaty.

[Bischof] What should this cooperation be like?

[Zlenko] We must concentrate on three essential points. The first concerns guarantees for our national security; this is primarily the business of the nuclear powers. There must be some multilateral agreements on this issue.

The second point concerns comprehensive economic aid for Ukraine. After the ratification, we must immediately dedicate ourselves to implementing the START I Treaty. Unfortunately, we do not have enough financial means of our own for this purpose. In this connection, I appeal to the other countries to consider that the implementation of the agreement is not only the business of Ukraine, but the entire international community.

[Bischof] To whom are you addressing your appeal?

[Zlenko] We would be very grateful if various European institutions, such as the EC, were to adopt a position on this matter and declare their intention to cooperate with Ukraine in implementing this treaty. This appeal is also addressed to the United Nations.

The third question concerns compensation for certain components of the nuclear weapons—above all, highly enriched uranium. We want compensation for that; otherwise, we would have to sell the uranium to interested states.

[Bischof] Has the West already reacted to your appeal? Has the pressure already become less?

[Zlenko] We are noticing everyday that the West is beginning to better understand our position. However, our work continues; I am in constant contact with my counterparts in other countries and am always convincing them of the importance of a common solution.

[Bischof] One day after you appealed to the deputies in the Kiev Parliament to ratify the START Treaty quickly because otherwise Ukraine would be threatened with international isolation, Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma demanded that Ukraine should temporarily declare itself a nuclear power and keep the 46 strategic SS-24 missiles. What do you think about his move?

[Zlenko] This was an interpretation of what parliamentary deputies reported from a closed meeting. Publicly, however, the Ukrainian prime minister never said anything about Ukraine's potential status as a nuclear power.

I cannot interpret and comment on what the head of government said at a closed meeting. It remains for every deputy to express his view on that.

[Bischof] Many of your fellow citizens complain that the West cares too little about events in Ukraine and is primarily interested in the political and economic developments in Russia. Do you also share this view?

[Zlenko] I, just like my government, am very disappointed about the attitude of some Western countries, which are exclusively focusing on Russia with the policy toward the East. However, it should be in the West's interest to

support the new independent states in the geopolitical area of the former Soviet Union and help safeguard and stabilize the situation politically and economically so that harmonious relations will develop between the new states.

It seems to me to be the wrong way if the West concentrates its direct aid almost exclusively on Russia because this might create an imbalance in the development of the new states. The West must deal with all successors of the USSR, even if it does have to do so particularly regarding the two largest ones, Russia and Ukraine.

[Bischof] One reason, above all, that Western businessmen hesitate to get involved in Ukraine is because the market economy reforms have been blocked. Do you see any prospects of the necessary economic reforms becoming unblocked in the Kiev Parliament?

[Zlenko] Of course, we want more investments in our country. Perhaps our reforms are not really making such speedy progress as some people would like. But we are trying to act very cautiously to circumvent mine fields. Therefore, we are perhaps thinking twice before we act so

as to avoid mistakes, which our neighbors have made in implementing economic reforms.

However, I want to assure everybody that we are continuing our political and economic reforms. At the same time, we must continue to be extremely careful so as to avoid any social conflict in our country. Any increase in the prices of foodstuffs or other goods immediately meets with a defensive reaction by the people.

[Bischof] In connection with the latest wave of strikes in the Donets region, demands by old communists turned up there that eastern Ukraine should unite with Russia. Is Ukraine threatened with territorial dissolution?

[Zlenko] We are very disappointed about such developments in our country. However, this miners' strike, in particular, shows what I have described before: Steps by the government in the direction of economic reforms immediately provoke an unpredictable social reaction.

The president and the government are doing their best to cope with this very complicated situation and prevent a territorial dissolution of Ukraine.

Article Lists Companies Supplying Arms to Former Yugoslavia

AU1606150593 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 10 Jun 93 p 1

[Vladimir Alexe article: "While the Romanians Are Guarding the Danube, European Firms Are Trading Arms in the Balkan Conflict"]

[Text] For the firms that produce weapons and military equipment or are just in the business of trading arms, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia seems to represent a true manna from heaven as far as business is concerned. This goes so far that it is difficult to tell whether this conflict is stimulating the arms business or, on the contrary, the conflict is stimulated because it brings profit to arms dealers in several countries. It is true that it would not be the first time in the very recent history when the interest of selling arms—as many as possible—brings about the perpetuation of certain bloody local conflicts. Obviously, this involves certain risks! Here is the list of the countries and firms that are "specialized" in the arms trade for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, namely Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia.

We believe that the number of those affairs is not very low. Meanwhile the Romanians are guarding the Danube.

AUSTRIA: AEOM Vienna; G.R. Handels Gesellschaft, Vienna; Rita Draksler; Industry Enterplait; Kaltenburg; MEIZ; Gebrüder Scholler GmbH; Atlantic, Graz; Hurtenberg; Scorpion International Services SA; Handil International Ltd. Consulting; WEBA, Graz; SBSZ Vienna; EXP-IMP, Vienna; DKS Vienna; Tomasek Import-Export Transit, Graz; RAS, Vienna; Hirlenberg; Rotsler; Voeresportwaffen; Global Consulting; Konsulate; WolfWien; Heinz Baumann; Furst Norbert; Sigfrid Wanka; Geoplan MBH; Invest VSD, Vienna; Burgrade-Astra, Vienna.

GERMANY: Imhausen AG; Denoro Technik; Vaterstelten; Faba, Foga, Nuremberg; Franconia-JA6D, Munich; Global Trade, Munich; Wolfgang; Helling, Munich; Electronic Equipment; Fheinstal; Heckler and Koch MBB; Messerschmidt; Volkov Pilotsi; Kraus-Maffai; NATO-schop, Munich; DIEL, Nuremberg; Deutsch Bank; Dresdner Bank AG, Darmstadt.

SWITZERLAND: Industrievertretungen, Zurich; Rampoint SA, Geneva; Luxik; Eurotrade; Dono; Grambaumontage.

ITALY: Kesser Italiana; Petro Beretta; Fanelli, Triest; Gibex, Modena; Immoterra AG International.

GREAT BRITAIN: Ostenday; Racal, London; Prestige; Commerce International Group Ltd.; Atlas Enterprises.

SWEDEN: Renta Saff; Alex Impex Sweden; BSM.

SPAIN: Falken SA Madrid.

THE NETHERLANDS: Seco-Import-Export.

NORWAY: Pluton International Trading Co, Oslo.

HUNGARY: Technika Foreign Trading Co, Budapest; Technika, Budapest; Universum SD, Budapest; Inex Trade Budapest.

POLAND: Cenzin; Agrowars; Danex; Bumar Labedi; Dausus, Gdansk.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA [as published]: Omnipol, Prague; CSAD, Prague; Kovosrot, Bratislava; Intex; Knorimpex, Pilsen; Altro GmbH, Bratislava.

BULGARIA: Kintex, Sofia; Technika, Sofia.

EGYPT: Akcaircraft, Cairo (Baghdad, Istanbul, and Moenchengladbach).

Thus, while Romania is losing because of the embargo, others—as one can see from the above list—are winning billions precisely as a result of it.

END OF

FICHE

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